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Sammendrag
Oppgaven tar for seg OWASP AppSensor-prosjektet. OWASP AppSensor er
en ide om angrepsdeteksjon inne i applikasjonen. Den sammenligner OWASP
AppSensor mot b˚ade en web applikasjons brannmur og et inntrengningsdetek-
sjonssystem. Sammenligningen er basert b˚ade p˚a et kort literaturestudie og
et eksperiment utført. Eksperimentet tok for seg en rekke angrep basert p˚a
OWASP sin topp ti liste som ble utført mot en enkel nettbankapplikasjon. I
eksperimentet ble inntrengerdeteksjonssystemet, nettapplikasjonsbrannmuren
og AppSensor detektorene inne i applikasjonen testet for a˚ se hvilke angrep
de klarer a˚ oppdage. Resultatet var veldig bra for b˚ade nettapplikasjonsbran-
nmuren og AppSensor siden begge klarte a˚ detektere mange angrep, men
AppSensor sin deteksjon var litt bedre.

Abstract
The thesis takes a look at the OWASP AppSensor project. The OWASP
AppSensor project is about the idea of detecting attacks inside the applicaiton.
The thesis compares OWASP AppSensor against both a web application
firewall and an intrusion detection system. The comparison is based both on
a short litterature study and an experiment performed. The experiment was
a set of attacks based on OWASP top ten list which were executed against
a simple bank web application. In the experiment the intrusion detection
systems, web application firewall and the AppSensor detection points inside
the application was tested to see which attacks they where able to detect.
The results were quite satisfying for both the web application firewall and
AppSensor meanin that they detected many attacks but AppSensors detection
was slightly better.

Acknowledgements
A big thank to Hanne Ekran Thomassen for reviewing the thesis and for
helping with both the language and structure of the thesis.
My external supervisor Erlend Oftedal from BEKK Consulting for supervisory
and help. Both in the construction of the experiment as well has helpful
feedback during the discussions and comparison. Also a big thank for pointing
me to the idea and concept of OWASP AppSensor and providing me some
interesting information about it.
My supervisor Lillian Røstad for help with the creating good research ques-
tions, help with the experiment and regular feedback during the thesis! She
also helped me keep in track with both the timing and the scope of the thesis.
My wife Stine Mari Enlien Thomassen, for being supporting and understanding
of the time required to finish the thesis. The work would have been a lot
harder without her support!

Contents
1 Introduction 1
2 Background 4
2.1 Network IDPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2 Detection Techniques in IDPS systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2.1 Signature-Based Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2.2 Anomaly-Based Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2.3 Stateful Protocol Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.3 Summary Network IDPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.4 Web Application Firewalls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.4.1 Usage of Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.4.2 WAF Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.4.3 WAF in a Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.5 Defense in Depth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.6 OWASP AppSensor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.6.1 AppSensor Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.6.2 OWASP AppSensor Detection Points . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.6.3 AppSensor Response Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.7 Other Systems for Defeating Web Application Attacks . . . . 25
2.7.1 Language Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.7.2 Platform Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.7.3 Web Application Frameworks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3 Research Method 28
3.1 Research Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.2 Different Research Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.2.1 Qualitative and Quantitative Strategy . . . . . . . . . 29
3.2.2 Experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.2.3 Chosen Research Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.3 Experiment Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
I
3.3.1 Environment for the Experiment . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.3.2 Setup of Snort . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.3.3 Setup of ModSecurity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.3.4 Building in the Detection Points . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.3.5 Using the Detection Points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.3.6 Execution of the Experiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
4 Scenario and Experiment 41
4.1 Business Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
4.1.1 Description of the Bank Web Site . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
4.1.2 Implementation Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
4.1.3 Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
4.2 Network Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
4.2.1 Firewall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
4.2.2 IDPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4.2.3 Web Application Firewall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4.2.4 Web and Application Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
4.3 Snort as IDPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
4.4 ModSecurity as WAF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
4.5 AppSensor Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
4.6 Drawbacks with the Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
4.7 Scenario Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
5 Attacks 58
5.1 Injection Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
5.1.1 SQL-Injection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
5.2 Cross Site Scripting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
5.3 Broken Authentication and Session Management . . . . . . . . 60
5.3.1 Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
5.3.2 Session Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
5.4 Insecure Direct Object References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
5.5 Cross-site Request Forgery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
5.6 Security Misconfiguration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
5.7 Insecure Cryptographic Storage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
5.8 Failure to Restrict URL Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
5.9 Insufficient Transport Layer Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
5.10 Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
6 Results 69
6.1 Cross Site Scripting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
6.2 SQL-Injection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
II
6.3 Broken Authentication and Session Management . . . . . . . . 71
6.4 Insecure Direct Object Reference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
6.5 Cross Site Request Forgery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
6.6 Failure to Restrict URL Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
6.7 Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
6.8 Testing Other IDS Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
6.8.1 Suricata With Emerging Threat Rules . . . . . . . . . 77
6.8.2 OSSEC Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
6.9 Validity of the Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
7 Discussion 80
7.1 General Trends from the Experiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
7.1.1 Unsatisfactory Snort Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
7.1.2 Trying to Get Snort to Detect the Attacks . . . . . . . 82
7.1.3 Very Satisfying AppSensor Results . . . . . . . . . . . 83
7.1.4 Drawbacks with OWASP AppSensor . . . . . . . . . . 86
7.2 Response Mechanisms and Blocking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
7.2.1 Snort Blocking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
7.2.2 ModSecurity Blocking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
7.2.3 AppSensor Response Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
8 Comparison 90
8.1 IDPS Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
8.2 WAF Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
8.2.1 Anomaly Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
8.2.2 A Note About Stateful Packet Inspection . . . . . . . . 93
8.3 AppSensor Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
8.4 Recommended Use of the Security Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . 95
8.4.1 Defense in Depth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
8.4.2 Why Not Take All of Them . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
8.4.3 IDPS or WAF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
8.4.4 AppSensor or WAF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
8.5 Comparison Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
9 Conclusion 100
9.1 Research Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
9.1.1 Research Question 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
9.1.2 Research Question 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
9.1.3 Research Question 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
9.1.4 Research Question 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
9.2 Further Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
III
9.2.1 Larger Experiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
9.2.2 Study of AppSensor in Practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
9.2.3 More Comprehensive IDPS Experiment . . . . . . . . . 105
9.2.4 Another Reference Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . 106
9.2.5 Testing AppSensor on a Production System . . . . . . 106
9.2.6 Make AppSensor and a WAF Cooperate . . . . . . . . 106
9.2.7 Test Anomaly Detection Against AppSensor . . . . . . 107
Appendix A Zip-file Contents i
Appendix B Screenshots of the Simplebank Application iii
IV
List of Tables
2.1 WAF Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2 Table from [32] with the detection points . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.3 AppSensor Response Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.1 Virtual Server Environment Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.2 Which detection points where implemented . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4.1 The OWASP Top Ten . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
6.1 Suricata Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
6.2 OSSEC results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
7.1 Which Attacks where Detected . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
7.2 Response Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
7.3 ModSecurity Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
8.1 Comparison of Strengths and Weaknesses . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
V
List of Figures
2.1 WAF and IDPS both setup in a inline fashion . . . . . . . . . 16
2.2 WAF and IDPS both setup in a monitor/out-of-band mode . . 17
2.3 Simple Architecture diagram from[32] . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.1 Scientific Method, from [36] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
4.1 Handling of HTTP requests and responses . . . . . . . . . . . 43
4.2 Network Diagram for the Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
4.3 Data Flow Diagram for the Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
4.4 Java EE Requests and responses with Filters . . . . . . . . . . 55
5.1 Showing Cross Site Scripting on the simplebank . . . . . . . . 60
5.2 Creating a new session cookie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
5.3 Tamperdata tampering with the transfer money request . . . . 63
6.1 ModSecurity Rule with Javascript code it embed . . . . . . . . 74
8.1 Defense in Depth Illustrated . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
8.2 Showing the main differences between IDPS, WAF and AppSensor 96
B.1 Frontpage for the Simplebank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
B.2 Loginpage for the Simplebank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
B.3 Register new user page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
B.4 Account overview page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
B.5 Create new account page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi
B.6 Transfer money page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi
VI
Chapter 1
Introduction
In the recent years, exploits against web application have risen. Today these
types of attacks are still on the rise[39], that have given birth to many new
web application security products. Although traditionally companies have
used intrusion detection and prevention systems which monitors the network
in general, there is now a widespread use of web application firewalls that
monitors and protects only web applications. While these are general solutions
to the security problems, there are still many attacks against specific business
logic and functionality of a web application. The thesis will take a look at
OWASP AppSensor project, which is a framework that can be integrated into
a custom web application so the application can defend and react to attacks
that is based on its own unique business logic and not only to general attacks.
An example of this is Cross-site scripting or SQL-injections.
The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) AppSensor project1 is
a OWASP project regarding their AppSensors technology. OWASP AppSensor
is an application level intrusion detection, which from here on is called
AppSensor.This is in contrast with network Intrusion Detection and Prevention
Systems (IDPS) which operate on the network level. The advantage with
AppSensor is that it is closer to the application and the data that it is trying to
protect. AppSensor can be used in custom software to get custom knowledge
of the application and how it operates while more generic IDPS systems only
can prevent general attacks that is application agnostic.
The overall goal of the thesis is to take a close look at which types of
attacks and threats AppSensor can protect against and compare with other
solutions. The other solutions will be both traditional network-level IDPS,Web
1https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_AppSensor_Project
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Application Firewall (WAF) , host-based IDPS and others. An evaluation
of where and how to use AppSensor effectively alongside with the other
technologies will be given. The evaluation will take into account, both which
types of attacks can be prevented where and if more than one technology
should be used to get satisfactory protection. The thesis will use a scenario
as a basis for the comparison. The scenario describes both a network setup
as well as the type of web application and some attacks to it.
The scenario is quite simple and will be implemented and used as a basis
for comparing the different technologies and make it easier to see real world
benefit from the different detection techniques. By having a scenario it is
easier to see both the benefits and the drawbacks with the different techniques
for detecting threats. Another benefit with implementing the scenario is that
experience with implementing AppSensor into a web application will be gained.
It will also help when comparing it against other drop-in solutions. Since
AppSensor need to be built into an application it can make the development
time larger and in almost all real life project there are time constraints. If a
general solution like a WAF can detect most of the attacks and require no
development time only some time to setup and deploy it can be much more
effective from a business standpoint.
A drawback by using a scenario and perform tests is that it is hard to
make a comparison between many different types of IDPS systems and web
application firewalls. It would require more time and resources than this
project have access to at the moment. Hence the thesis will compare a few
such systems against each other and it will be noted that other systems might
perform differently. This means other systems may detect other attacks or
fail to detect attacks that the systems in the thesis detects. However it is
hoped that the systems used in the experiment will be fairly comparative to
other similar products.
To break down the overall goal it were transformed into four research questions.
These questions is what the thesis is answering and the sum of them gives
the overall goal.
• RQ1: What is the current state of application-based intrusion detection
and prevention systems?
• RQ2: How does OWASP AppSensor compare to other IDPS technolo-
gies?
• RQ3: In the given scenario, what are the benefits of using AppSensors
compared with trying to stop the attacks in a IDPS or WAF?
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• RQ4: How hard is it to built AppSensor into an application?
Thesis Outline
The thesis start with a background chapter, which goes through some back-
ground in intrusion detection in a web application context. It discusses
intrusion detection and prevention systems, web application firewalls and
OWASP AppSensor in detail. Chapter 3 describes the research method chosen
for the research questions in the thesis. It also contains some details about
why and how the experiment was done. Chapter 4 explains the scenario
developed and how it relates to the experiment. The next chapter details the
attacks done in the experiment which were extracted from OWASP top ten.
The results are presented in Chapter 6. The results chapter explains if and how
the attack was detected. The discussion Chapter 7 discusses the results and
also highlights some other properties about the different security mechanisms
that was not revealed by the experiment. In the comparison chapter these
different security mechanisms are compared, this chapter was made so that
the discussion chapter would not become too large but also to give a thorough
answer to research question 2 and 3. The last chapter is the conclusion, which
summarizes the biggest discoveries in the thesis and contains suggestions for
further work.
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Chapter 2
Background
This chapter starts with an overview over traditional network-based IDPS
systems. The objective is to give the newer web-application based IDPS
systems more context and also highlight the different techniques which have
been used over the years. Traditional IDPS systems have become very
sophisticated over the years and modern ones incorporate many different
techniques for detecting and preventing threats and attacks. The chapter will
also help understanding the evolution from network-based IDPS systems and
how and why more specialized systems such as a Web Application Firewall
were developed.
2.1 Network IDPS
The NIST Special Publication 800-94[50] gives an overview over traditional
intrusion detection and prevention systems. It explains the purpose of, the
common techniques used and types of IDPS systems.
Intrusion detection and prevention systems have several uses. Their main
purpose is to identify and prevent incidents. This means that a pure Intrusion
Detection System (IDS) should be able to identify possible attacks, for example
a malicious payload from an incoming packet. If the IDS is also a Intrusion
Prevention System (IPS) it should be able to respond to the attack, by for
example blocking malicious incoming packets. In the thesis the term IDPS is
used whenever these differences are not important. Three other uses from
the publication was also mentioned:
• Security policy violation. For example if certain traffic should be
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blocked by a firewall, but is not, the IDPS system might alert the
administrators.
• Documenting existing threats to an organization. Meaning that
an IDPS will log and alert the administrators about threats it de-
tects. Understanding the threats will help in identifying which security
measures needs to be applied to which resources.
• Deterring individuals from violating security policies. If indi-
viduals are being monitored by a IDPS system they may be less likely
to commit violations against the security policies because of the risk of
detection.
The thesis will focus on the primary tasks of IDPS, which is the detection and
possible prevention of attacks. When an IDPS responds against a threat, it can
use several response techniques, again from the NIST special publication[50]:
• The IDPS stops the attack itself. This can be done, for example by
terminating the network connection or user session used for the attack.
Block access to the target from the offending user account, IP address
or other attack attribute. Block all access to the targeted host, service,
application or other resource.
• The IDPS changes the security environment. The IDPS can
change the configuration of other security controls, for example a firewall,
in order to stop an attack.
• The IDPS changes the attacks content. The IDPS can change the
attack content so it is no longer dangerous. For example by stripping a
malicious email attachment from an email before delivering it.
Another point about IDPS is that they are not accurate in their detection.
False positives and false negatives are therefore an issue when using these
types of systems. In many cases when one lower either false positives or
false negatives rates the other type raises, meaning that a decrease in false
negatives will most likely increase false positives. Altering the configuration of
an IDPS to improve the detection accuracy is called tuning. If the IDPS is also
responsible to prevent attacks, false positives may have severe consequences.
For example if the main web-server is moved from one physical host to another
and is then blocked by the IDPS because of too much traffic in a new place, it
can be devastating for a business. The organization using IDPS systems must
therefore be careful when configuring them to prevent them from harming
the business in case of false positives or false negatives.
There are several techniques used for detecting intrusions, these techniques
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are used in varying degree across all the different types of intrusion detection
systems including web application firewall.
• Signature-Based Detection. A signature is a pattern that corre-
sponds to a known threat. Signature-based detection compares the
events the IDSP observe against a set of known signatures. The strength
is to identify known threats with high accuracy, but the weakness is it
can not detect unknown threats.
• Anomaly-Based Detection. A anomaly-based detection compares
what it considers normal behavior and alerts when it detects abnormal
behavior. Anomaly-based detection will be discussed more in Subsection
2.2.2
• Stateful Protocol Analysis. Stateful protocol analysis1 is the process
of comparing predetermined profiles of generally accepted definitions of
benign protocol activity for each protocol state against observed events
to identify deviations.
There are also several types of IDPS systems. These types of IDPS systems
have different areas which they monitors and in the publication it is recom-
mended to use a variety of these types in order to cover most cases. In the
Nist special publication these four are mentioned:
• Network-Based - Monitors network traffic for some or all parts of a
network. It analyses the network and application protocol activity to
identify suspicious activity.
• Wireless - Monitors wireless traffic and analyzes it to identify suspicious
activity
• Network Behavior Analysis - Examines network traffic in terms of
flow and identify attacks based on network flow, such as distributed
denial of service attacks (DDoS) or other malicious network activities.
• Host-Based - Monitors a single host and the events occurring within
that particular host for suspicious activity.
2.2 Detection Techniques in IDPS systems
As mentioned in Section 2.1 there are several techniques or methodologies in
detecting threats. This section will walk through them in more detail and
1Stateful protocol analysis is sometimes called deep packet inspection by some vendors.
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explain their advantages and disadvantages.
2.2.1 Signature-Based Detection
Signature-based detection compares the signatures of detected events against
a list of known malicious signatures. This method for detection can be very
effective against known threats, but ineffective against unknown threats.
Another weakness is that known threats can use evasion techniques, such as
changing slightly, giving it a new signature but still performs the old malicious
action. A simple example can be an email-attachment named freekisses.exe
is malicious and the IDS have a signature looking for freekisses.exe. If the
attacker where to change the filename to for example freekissessuperversion.exe
the signatures would no longer match, but the executable file would still be
the same2.
These limitations make it trivial for an attacker to circumvent the signature-
based detection, however it creates a cat and mouse game between the IDS
updating its signatures and the attacker changing the malware. Another
strength is that there are fewer false positives when doing pure signature-based
detection.
2.2.2 Anomaly-Based Detection
Anomaly-based detection is to compare what is called a normal state of
behavior against the observed behaviors and check for significant deviations
from what is considered normal. An IDPS system which uses anomaly-based
detection must have a profile of what it considers normal3. Such a profile
is created by having a training phase were the IDPS system learns what is
normal behavior in the network it is monitoring. This learning phase is often
done for some time so the IDPS learns typical networks trends, for example
work-hours and backup traffic at night. Such a profile can either be static
or dynamic. A static profile never changes unless the IDPS generates a new
profile or updates the old one. A dynamic profile is constantly adjusting its
consideration of normal behavior based on the events observed. The benefit
2A more sophisticated signature could look into the file itself, but the principle is still
the same. Change something unimportant so that it does not match anymore but the
malware is still functional.
3Normal is different from each case, it can be network traffic, normal hosts and the
traffic between them etc.
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of a dynamic profile is that it will easier cope with small changes, for example
new workstations added to the network. Because of this a static profile will
be inaccurate over time and there would be a need to reconfigure from time to
time. This problem is avoided using dynamic profiling. A weakness by using
a dynamic profile is that an attacker can perform an attack but start slowly
and then increase the attack as time goes by. By doing this the dynamic
profile will be updated to include the attack, one step at a time until the
attack is considered normal behavior.
The anomaly-based detection mode biggest advantage is its ability to detect
previously unknown threats. This because it will block all behavior that is
not considered normal and an attack will most of the time not be considered
as normal behavior. The biggest downside is that often, what is normal
behavior will be flagged as abnormal by the anomaly-based detection method.
For example a user might distribute a large email attachment to many of his
coworkers, which might be considered spam and blocked by the anomaly-based
detection method, resulting in a false positive. On the other hand an attacker
might also trick it, either by slowly performing the attack against a dynamic
profiling or it might be that the attack is not distinguished from normal
behavior, resulting in a false negative.
2.2.3 Stateful Protocol Analysis
A stateful protocol analysis is the process of analyzing network traffic against
predetermined profiles and rules for behavior based on the protocol state.
The biggest difference between stateful protocol analysis and anomaly-based
detection is that unlike anomaly detection, which uses host or network specific
profiles, stateful protocol analysis relies on well known standards for how
specific protocols should be used. This is typically based on the Internet
Engineering Taskforce(IETF) Requests for Comments (RFC) or form protocols
developed by software vendors. The word stateful in stateful protocol analysis
means that the analysis tracks and changes depending on the state the protocol
is in. For example when a user connects to a server using the Transport Layer
Security (TLS) protocol, the protocol starts in handshake mode, where the
server is authenticated. Only when the handshake is done the protocol is
allowed to send data. If an attacker tries to send data before the handshake is
complete a stateful protocol analysis would detect this and count the activity
as suspicious.
The protocol analysis part is often done by performing reasonable checks for
the protocol, such as checking the argument lengths used in the protocol. If
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a threshold which is not in the specification of the protocol or just abnormal
behavior, the stateful protocol analysis might flag the activity as suspicious.
There are several drawbacks with using stateful protocol analysis. The biggest
drawback is that stateful protocol analysis is very resource intensive, which
means that if it is placed inline in a network it can easily become a bottleneck,
especially when tracking many different protocols simultaneously. Another
drawback is that often vendors might differ from the standard protocol,
either because of bugs or just to have their own optimizations of a protocol.
This makes it difficult for a stateful protocol analysis to tell the difference
between harmful deviation and benign deviation from the protocol. The
last drawback is that stateful protocol analysis can not detect attacks which
do not violate a protocol specification, for example an SQL-injection attack
against a webserver can be delivered over a perfectly legal HTTP-protocol
request.
2.3 Summary Network IDPS
The types of network IDPS systems presented here provide an overview of
the IDPS systems which work at the network level, up to the 7 layer in the
International standards organizations(ISO) Open Systems Interconnection
(OSI) model. However they do not always inspect the data carried to the
application, which other detection systems does. The different types of IDPS
systems looked at here are mostly complementary to each other, meaning
that an organization can deploy all four kinds if it wants to be fully covered
with IDPS technology.
2.4 Web Application Firewalls
Web Application Firewalls(WAF) are firewalls that operates at the application
layer from the ISO OSI model. They intercept traffic going to a web application
and understand HTTP and web applications at a much deeper level than
network IDPS systems4. The main benefit is that the WAF is able to
understand how a web application works. For example tracking state through
cookies rather than the stateless HTTP protocol itself. A WAF is also typically
4Many vendors have IDPS systems that does many of the same HTTP analysis as a
Web Application Firewall, the lines between network IDPS and WAF are therefore often
much more blurry in practice.
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not dependent on the type of web application but can be placed in front of
any type of web application.
2.4.1 Usage of Terms
In this thesis, a WAF means any web application level firewall that is in front
of a web application in some fashion. This can be either on the same host, as
part of the web server serving the application or a standalone appliance that
can be placed anywhere in the network in the path to the web application. A
WAF can also be a hardware appliance of a software component that can be
installed on an existing system. The Web Application Security Consortium
(WASC) in their document [33] have several examples of how a WAF can be
configured in front of a web application.
A WAF can utilize several detection techniques; some of these have a lot in
common with the techniques used in IDPS systems. The WAF can use a
negative security model that means all transactions are allowed by default. The
transactions which contain attacks are rejected. This method can use either
signature-based, just as with IDPS or rule-based, which is more complex logic
added to the signatures. Positive security model means that all transactions
are denied by default and only those who are known to be valid are trusted.
These two methods are analogous to a firewall, configured to use either a
black or white-list approach.
2.4.2 WAF Features
The primary function of a WAF is to protect a web application against detected
vulnerabilities and to prevent them from being exploited by attackers. The
basic method for doing this is by a blacklisting approach which filters known
attacks against a web application, for example to automatically sanitize a
request containing an SQL-injection. In addition to support black listing,
which is similar to Signature-based detection described in 2.2.1 a WAF can also
support white listing or anomaly-based detection The white listing approach
is similar to the anomaly-based detection, described in Subsection 2.2.2. Both
requires a learning period where they learn how the network traffic or web
application traffic behaves so they are able to detect abnormal behavior and
respond accordingly. A summary of the different types of attacks and how
effectively a WAF can prevent them is shown in Table 2.1 from [35]. The
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table gives an overview of which problems a WAF is good at handling and
which it is not as good at handling.
The WAF can also perform normalization of the traffic in order to be able
to detect if an attacker is trying to masquerade the attack payload in a way
that looks harmless, but when decoded by the web application executes the
payload.
A WAF can, in addition to protecting the web application, handle some of
the work currently done by the web application. For example it can help
by logging relevant security information from the normal traffic flow. The
web application firewall can handle cookies, which are used to track state
and login information and prevent an attacker from tampering with them of
prevent information leakage, with for example using cookie encryption. By
outsourcing some of this work to a WAF the web application can free up
resources to handle the business logic more effectively.
Table 2.1: WAF attacks
+ very well covered by a WAF
- can not be covered by a WAF
! dependent on the WAF or application
= can partially be covered by a WAF
Problem WAF Countermeasure
Cookie protection + Cookies can be signed
+ Cookies can be encrypted
! Cookies can be completely hidden or
replaced (Cookie Store)
! Cookies can be linked to the client IP.
Information leakage + Cloaking filter, outgoing pages can be
cleaned (error messages, comments, un-
desirable information).
Session riding
(CSRF)
+ URL encryption/token
Session Timeout ! Timeout for active and inactive (idle)
sessions can be specified (if the WAF
can manage the sessions itself). Even if
the sessions are managed by the appli-
cation, the WAF can detect these and
terminate them with the appropriate
configuration.
Continues on next page
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Problem WAF Countermeasure
Session fixation = Can be prevented if the WAF manages
the sessions itself
Session hijacking - Difficult to prevent, although the WAF
can issue an alarm in the event of irreg-
ularities (e.g. changing IP) or terminate
a session with changing IP.
File upload + Virus check (generally via external sys-
tems) via ICAP linked to the WAF.
Parameter tamper-
ing
+ In addition to/instead of data valida-
tion (see below), parameter manipula-
tion can be prevented via URL encryp-
tion (GET) and parameter encryption
(GET and POST).
+ Site usage enforcement, meaning the
possible sequence of URLs can be fixed
or can be detected
Forced Browsing + Can be prevented via URL encryption.
+ Sire usage enforcement
Path traversal
(URL) link valida-
tion
+ Can be prevented via URL encryption.
+ Site usage enforcement .
Path traversal (pa-
rameter), path ma-
nipulation
+ See parameter tampering and data vali-
dation.
Logging + All or only specific/permitted parts of
the data of a request and of the con-
nected tests can be logged.
Priv. escalation - Privilege escalation can not be checked
or can only be checked to a limited de-
gree, for example via cookie/parameter
encryption.
Logical level - Application logic going beyond the va-
lidity of URLs and form fields, can not
normally be checked by a WAF.
Continues on next page
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Problem WAF Countermeasure
Anti-automation = Automatic attacks can be partially de-
tected and blocked (e.g. number of re-
quests/time interval, identical requests,
etc.).
Application DoS
(moderate)
= Transactions, IPs,and/or users can be
blocked.
= Connections and/or sessions can be
ended .
SSL + WAF can force SSL with pre-defined
encryption strength (depending on the
infrastructure scenario).
+ SSL termination on the WAF, forward-
ing of the SSL data (e.g. client certifi-
cate) to application.
+ SSL connection possible from WAF to
application.
Data validation (re-
lating to field/con-
tent/context/appl)
+ Can be tested to very detailed degree
(length, constant value/range of values,
e.g. for SELECT, character area); val-
idation possible with whitelist and/or
blacklist (signature).
+ Rules can in part be generated automat-
ically.
! High dependency on application, spe-
cific fields (hidden form) or pre-defined
parameters in the URL; can be auto-
matically verified by the WAF however.
- Risk due to false positives, problematic
with business critical applications in par-
ticular.
Data validation
(general/global)
+ HTTP(w3c) conformity, a WAF con-
ducts a canonalisation of the data so
that it is available to the application in
a standardised form.
Buffer overflow + See data validation[1]
Continues on next page
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Problem WAF Countermeasure
Format string at-
tack
= Can be detected using data validation if
the corresponding characters or strings
are filtered (difficult in practice, as pre-
cise knowledge of the application is re-
quired to do this). For the majority
of the hidden input fields, this can be
carried out without knowledge of the
application.
Cross-site scripting = Using data validation, only reflected
XSS can be detected and prevented, per-
sistent XSS can not be detected, DOM-
based XSS only to be limited degree if
part of the attack is sent in parameters
of the request.
Cross-site tracing + Restriction of the HTTP method to, for
example GET or POST.
WebDAV + Restriction to only reading WebDAV
methods possible
Code injection
(PHP, perl, java)
+ See data validation [1]
Command injection + See data validation [1]
SQL injection + See data validation [1]
LDAP injection + See data validation [1]
XML/Xpath injec-
tion
+ See data validation [1]
Just-in-time patch-
ing (hotfix patch-
ing)
+ Using data validation (see above), the
WAF can protect against newly de-
tected vulnerabilities and/or attacks
(Zero Day Exploit).
HTTP response
splitting (HTTP
splitting)
! Can only be detected using data val-
idation in URL and/or parameters if
%0d%0a is filtered - however this can
be carried out on virtually any input
field without impairing the functional-
ity of the application.
HTTP request
smuggling
+ Is prevented via strict testing of the
conformity to standards of each request.
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2.4.3 WAF in a Network
A WAF can have several placements in a network. In general there is a
differences between passive and active mode. In a passive mode, the WAF
only gets a copy of the traffic to the web-server, via for example a network
monitoring port. It is harder for a WAF to respond to an attack while being
placed in passive mode, but it can still communicate with other network
equipment or the web-server itself in order to prevent certain connections.
The main advantage with passive mode is that the performance of the WAF
would not have any impact on the web-server and another layer with proxying
is avoided. Active mode places the WAF inline with the traffic going to
the web-server. The main advantage of placing a WAF inline is that the
WAF itself is able to drop connections and filter content before it arrives
at the web-server. There are several drawbacks. The WAF can become a
performance bottleneck for the web-application or the WAF can become a
single point of failure. In addition the network become more complex and
thereby more difficult to handle. Despite these drawbacks a WAF is most
often used in inline mode, since there are many techniques to avoid these
drawbacks, such as having multiple redundant WAFs and sharing the load
between them.
When placing a WAF in active mode inline in a network, there are several
ways to do this. The Web Application Firewall Evaluation Criteria[33] lists
four different active modes.
• Bridge. The WAF is installed as a transparent bridge, often called
transparent proxy
• Router. The network traffic is configured to be directed through the
WAF
• Reverse Proxy. The traffic is directed through the WAF either by
DNS-changes or network level changes
• Embedded. The WAF is embedded in the web-server or directly in
front. Sometimes called host-based WAF
In a big corporate network there are many other configurations possible, but
these cover the most used methods. The two biggest differences is between
an inline fashion, meaning that the WAF is somewhere in the traffic line or
out-of-band, called passive mode. These are shown in the figures 2.1 which
show a sample inline configuration and 2.2 which shows a sample out-of-band
configuration.
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Figure 2.1: WAF and IDPS both setup in a inline fashion
There are many advantages by placing a WAF inline in the traffic. The biggest
advantage is that the WAF itself can block traffic it consider suspicious. In
addition to easily block the traffic the WAF can help the web application in
several other ways as Jim Beechey points out in his sans paper [30], as shown
below.
• Caching - Reducing the load on the web server by caching static and
much used content
• Compression - The WAF can compress the content before delivery, so
the web server do not have to perform the compression
• SSL Acceleration - A WAF can utilize hardware accelerated SSL pro-
cessing, however the WAF needs a copy of the domains SSL-keys
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• Load balancing - The WAF can spread the incoming connections among
several web servers, removing the need for an extra load balancer
• Connection Pooling - This technique reduces the amount of new TCP-
connection needing to be established with the web servers.
The biggest disadvantage in inline mode is that the WAF can become a
bottleneck and it also features yet another proxy before reaching the web-
server, which do complicate the setup.
Figure 2.2: WAF and IDPS both setup in a monitor/out-of-band mode
When placing the WAF in passive out-of-band mode, it is harder for the
WAF to perform blocking of suspicious traffic. However it can send packet to
terminate TCP-connections or be configured to get the firewall in front to
block the traffic. The main advantage is that the WAF is not in the danger
of becoming a bottleneck and the rest of the network will function normally
even of the WAF crashes. This mode is also ideal for testing the WAF on
real network traffic or for learning a anomaly detection-based WAF.
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2.5 Defense in Depth
Defense in depth is a security principle. The principle is that there should be
more than one method for securing something. Bruce Schneier has a simple
explanation for the defense in depth principle in an article from 2000 [51].
Provide Defense in Depth. Don’t rely on single solutions. Use
multiple complementary security products, so that a failure in one
does not mean total insecurity. This might mean a firewall, an
intrusion detection system and strong authentication on important
servers.
The defense in depth principle is not only a technological principle, but affects
both people, technology and operations as NSA points out in their defense in
depth strategy paper [28]. They also point out several ways of performing
defense in depth. The two most important ones for this thesis is listed below:
• Defense in Multiple Places. Meaning that an organization need to
deploy security mechanisms in different places.
• Layered Defenses. This means to have many layers of defense. For
example to have both a corporate firewall and also a software firewall
on each host.
When it comes to the usage of firewalls, IDPS and WAFs the layered defenses
method is one to consider, since many of these products overlap in terms of
functionality. However it is for example only the WAF which understands
the web application context in layer 7 of the ISO OSI model, while both a
corporate firewall and IDPS system protects at a network level. They also
have different responsibilities. A more thorough example of a layered defense
would be the usage of both network level IDPS and in addition host-based
IDPS systems. That way a threat, which slips the network level IDS can still
be detected by the host-based IDS.
Defense in depth is used because there is no definitive way of securing yourself.
There is no silver bullet as Leight and Hammer points out in [43]. They also
mention several approaches to defense in depth. Uniform protection treats
all systems as equally important, meaning that no special consideration or
protection is made for different systems. This is the most common approach to
defense in depth and is quite useful but weak against attacks targeted at special
assets in the organization, the so called crown jewels. Protected enclaves
approach involves separating the network into different separate networks.
This is typically done with networking equipment such as firewall, VLANs,
18
VPNs and so on. Vector Oriented defense in depth involves identifying the
vectors which threats can become manifest and deploy security mechanisms
to shut down the vector. Information Centric defense in depth means to
defend the information or any other values that needs protection. And then
the defense is build around that information so that in order to get the
information, each layer needs to be penetrated. In this thesis, which focuses
mostly on web application the information centric approach will be used since
it is assumed that the values that needs protection are in the web application
database and accessible through the web application and therefore needs good
protection.
In this thesis, a comparison of a web application firewall and OWASP AppSen-
sor will be performed. The different attacks is evaluated if it should be
prevented by a WAF, in the application itself with the help of AppSensor or
according to the defense in depth principle should be blocked both places.
2.6 OWASP AppSensor
The OWASP AppSensor project[32] is a project which aims to help developers
of custom web application to detect and prevent attacks which can happen
at the business logic. The idea behind OWASP AppSensor project is that it
is not a product, like a WAF would be, but rather an idea with a reference
implementation in a Java framework that can tie onto OWASP ESAPI [14].
The idea is that while a WAF can protect against generic attacks for example
a SQL-injection, it can not protect against business logic attacks against a
custom web application, such as a POST-request against a field which should
only use GET.
The idea is realized by having two parts, one part is the detection sensors in the
application, which detects possible attacks and the other part is the response
mechanisms, which makes appropriate responses to the attacks. These two
parts are shown in figure 2.3 for a 3-layer architecture. The detection points
are custom made into the application by the developers, but can use many
of the already made detection points in the AppSensor framework or extend
them with their own.
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Figure 2.3: Simple Architecture diagram from[32]
The OWASP AppSensor project consists of both the idea and concept of using
detection sensors in a web-application as well as a sample implementation
of the AppSensor framework in Java. The concept of using detection points
in an application to see what is going on is the heart of the project. It is a
very powerful concept, just as a bank have surveillance cameras in addition
to having a huge vault with a time-based lock. Because in addition to being
secure by having a time-based lock the bank also would want to identify
potential attacks well ahead of time and react to suspicious activity. A typical
web-application can be coded securely and resist attacks, however by deploying
sensors in the application. The application itself and its administrators, is able
to know what is going on in real-time inside the application. This information
can be valuable since the application or its administrators, are able to block
an attacker before he can actually find a potential weakness in the application.
The application can also be able to turn of some functionality or to just
block one user, thereby still functioning during an attack, which helps in the
availability of the service the application is serving.
AppSensor might have some of the problems traditional IDPS and WAFs have,
which is both false positives and false negatives. However OWASP in their
paper about AppSensor[32] argue that since it is so close to the application
and its logic, the rate of false positives can be dramatically reduced. This
is because some behavior can never occur when a normal user using the
application. An example from OWASP in their AppSensor paper [32] is a
GET request when the application expects a POST request. Another example
is tampering with the data within a POST-request, which requires explicit
attempts from a user to do so and would not happen in a normal use case.
Such actions can therefore be detected with a high degree of confidence that
the user is malicious. On the other side, AppSensor might detect that an
user for example is putting a ”’” inside a username field. It might be an
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attacker looking for a SQL-injection but it can also be just a typo from a
user. This is where AppSensor will have the same problem as an IDPS or
WAF in detecting what is actually an attack and what is just unusual but
benign behavior.
2.6.1 AppSensor Usage
Currently OWASP AppSensor is used by several companies as several of the
AppSensor projects participants points out in their crosstalk article from
2011 [57]. Since OWASP AppSensor is both a concept as well as a simple
framework, with the idea of being extended and tailored for the custom
application implementing it. Many companies mentioned in the crosstalk
both extended the OWASP implementation and some build it themselves
from scratch. As said in the crosstalk article, one adopter uses it heavily
integrated with a Security information and event management (SIEM) system.
The main point is that there are many possibilities in how to use AppSensors
and while the project itself is a simple example implementation, it is meant
for the adopters to extend its use. In a talk given by Michael Coates5 he
points out that at Mozilla, they use the AppSensor principles and ideas while
they are not based on the AppSensor projects code base. They have their
own standalone implementation used in their web-applications. This points
out that the AppSensor project is mostly an idea and a concept and secondly
provides a reference implementation in Java, which can be used in Java-based
web-applications.
2.6.2 OWASP AppSensor Detection Points
The OWASP AppSensor project comes with many detection points out of
the box. These are the generic detection points supplied with the AppSensor
project, but it is easy to create other detection points in addition to the ones
provided by the OWASP project. These detection points must be put to use
inside a custom application and are provided since they are quite generic. In
the OWASP AppSensor paper[32] is a detailed description of the different
detection points. In Table 2.2 the different detection points from the paper is
listed.
5http://vimeo.com/15726323
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Table 2.2: Table from [32] with the detection points
ID Event
Request
RE1 Unexpected HTTP Commands
RE2 Attempts To Invoke Unsupported HTTP
Methods
RE3 GET When Expecting POST
RE4 POST When Expecting GET
Authentication
AE1 Use of Multiple Usernames
AE2 Multiple Failed Passwords
AE3 High Rate Of Login Attempts
AE4 Unexpected Quantity Of Characters In User-
name
AE5 Unexpected Quantity Of Characters In Pass-
word
AE6 Unexpected Types Of Characters In User-
name
AE7 Unexpected Types Of Characters In Password
AE8 Providing Only The Username
AE9 Providing Only the Password
AE10 Adding Additional POST Variables
AE11 Removing POST Variables
Session
SE1 Modifying Existing Cookies
SE2 Adding New Cookies
SE3 Deleting Existing Cookies
SE4 Substituting Another Users Valid Session ID
Or Cookie
SE5 Source IP Address Changes During Session
SE6 Change Of User Agent Mid Session
Access Control
ACE1 Modifying URL Arguments Within A GET
For Direct Object Access Attempts
ACE2 Modifying Parameters Within A POST For
Direct Object Access Attempts
ACE3 Force Browsing Attempts
ACE4 Evading Presentation Access Control
Through Custom Posts
Input
IE1 Cross Site Scripting Attempt
EE2 Violations Of Implemented White Lists
Encoding
EE1 Double Encoded Characters
Continues on next page
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ID Event
EE2 Unexpected Encoding Used
Command Injection
CIE1 Blacklist Inspection For Common SQL Injec-
tion Values
CIE2 Detect Abnormal Quantity Of Returned
Records
CIE3 Null Byte Character In File Request
CIE4 Carriage Return Or Line Feed Character In
File Request
File IO
FIO1 Detect Large Individual Files
FIO2 Detect Large Number Of File Uploads
User Trend
UT1 Irregular Use Of Application
UT2 Speed Of Application Use
UT3 Frequency Of Site Use
UT4 Frequency Of Feature Use
System Trend
STE1 High Number Of Logouts Across The Site
STE2 High Number Of Logins Across The Site
STE3 High Number Of Same Transaction Across
The Site
The detection points in Table 2.2 must be placed inside a web application
at appropriate places. For example to place a RE3 detection point requires
knowledge about the web application and it is easier to implement when the
application is being developed, than in hindsight. This is probably the biggest
difference between AppSensor and both IDPS and WAF systems, it is not
just a drop-in system that can be added to a web application, it has to be
built in.
These detection points are only few of many possible. In a custom application
it is possible to make custom detection points which understands the appli-
cations logic. Another big feature is that an implementer is able to specify
both a custom detection point but also the threshold of either the custom
detection point or some of the other existing ones. For example an online
webshop might make a detection point that detects if a user trying to pay
with many different credit cards which gets refused. This could signal a user
that is trying to use stolen credit cards to pay for the merchandise in the
webshop.
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2.6.3 AppSensor Response Actions
The AppSensor project also contains a list over default response actions
which an AppSensor powered application can use. These actions will be
performed when a certain threshold is reached. The thresholds are counters
for how many different detection points are triggered and is also defined by
the implementer. For example one action can be to log out the user when he
has tried 6 attempts to perform a XSS-injection. Another action can be to
block the users IP-address if he tries XSS-injection again after logging back
in.
The AppSensor project contains four levels it can use when taking action,
silent, passive, active and intrusive. The silent actions does not alert the user
but silently logs, alerts the application administrators or other silent actions.
Passive actions notifies the user, but does not prevent him in any way from
using the web application. The notification might be an alert, an email or
the application might slow the requests from that user down. Active actions
often deny the user access. It can be achieved by logging the user out, disable
the user account, disable the component under attack, block the user from
the application or other means of denying access. The last ones are intrusive
and these actions can for example log information about the user such as
their remote IP-address, browser signatures and other information. These
intrusive actions are meant to be non-malicious but one got to be careful so
these actions does not do something illegal. The response actions which the
AppSensor team has come up with are in Table 2.3 which is a copy of the
one from the OWASP wiki.
Not all the response actions in Table 2.3 are implemented in the OWASP
AppSensor framework. The table is made to give users of either the AppSensor
concept or the framework an idea of which response actions it is possible to take
against a malicious user. The default response actions which are provided by
the framework is to log, logout, disable the user account, disable a component
either completely of just for a particular user, email an administrator or send
an sms to an administrator through email to sms. These are the response
actions which are included in the framework from the OWASP project, but
as seen in Table 2.3 there are many other possibilities for response actions.
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Table 2.3: AppSensor Response Actions
Type ID Description
Silent
ASR-A Logging Change
ASR-B Administrator Notification
ASR-C Other Notification
ASR-N Proxy
Passive
ASR-D User Status Change
ASR-E User Notification
ASR-F Timing Change
Active
ASR-G Process Terminated
ASR-H Function Amended
ASR-I Function Disabled
ASR-J Account Logout
ASR-K Account Lockout
ASR-L Application Disabled
Intrusive ASR-M Collect Data from User
2.7 Other Systems for Defeating Web Appli-
cation Attacks
There have been many other attempts to defeat web application attacks and
while many of them resemble a WAF or IDPS they are not labeling themselves
as such. Often there are differences which will not make them justice by
calling them a WAF or IDPS. The reason they are included is to give a view
of the size of the research that have gone into solving the security problem
for web applications.
2.7.1 Language Defense
There have been many attempts to make language themselves protect against
misbehavior. James Morris provided a means of protecting objects in lan-
guages as far back as 1973 [45]. Languages used on the web today which are
often either interpreted (Perl, Python, Ruby) or run on a virtual machine
(C#, Java), called managed code is almost immune toward buffer overflows
which have been pestering languages such as C and C++ where the developers
themselves have to check boundary conditions. The biggest danger modern
languages faces is the handling of untrusted data and then deliver those data
to another system or language. One example is to deliver untrusted data
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from a HTML form to a database interpreter which then interprets the SQL
and if the data contains SQL-commands they will be executed.
A feature of some programming languages or frameworks is taint-tracking.
Most famously taint-tracking have been a feature of Perl [17], which makes
Perl mark input from an external entity as tainted [18]. If the tainted data is
used for example as an argument to a shell command, Perl will exit with an
error of the data passed to the command is tainted and has not been properly
cleaned. This idea of tainted data have inspired many other works such as the
black box approach from R. Sekar[52], which places itself between the different
web server components making it a drop in solution. Another approach that
patched the PHP-interpreter itself in order to prevent injection attacks is
presented by Tadeusz Pietraszek and Chris Vanden Berghe in their paper from
2005[47]. As mentioned in [47], there are many other methods that involve
either changes to the language run-time or the platform or environment of
the web application in order to have a generic way of preventing injection
attacks.
2.7.2 Platform Defense
Many modern platforms operating systems contain some level of built in
protection. While the platform defenses are targeted at a broader range
of attacks than just web application attacks, some of the defenses can still
improve the security of the web application. The use of mandatory access
controls, which now is part of Microsoft Windows VistaTMand Microsoft
Windows Server 2008TMand above called mandatory integrity control[44], is
one such mechanism. This helps in separating processes from each other
and can help prevent for example a command injection attack to be able to
remove data from another place in the system because of limited access6.
2.7.3 Web Application Frameworks
Most web applications today are made by using web application frameworks
to provide much standard functionality, like easy creation of forms, object-
relational mappers (ORM) [10], authentication and authorization, handling
of sessions and many other features. The benefits is that the developers
6Standard UNIX have had separate users from the beginning. In addition there are
tools like AppArmor [2] and SE-Linux [21] and in some BSD-based systems the mac from
[8] can be used.
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can focus on writing business logic for their application while the standard
plumbing is taken care of by the web application framework. Many security
features can also be present in a framework, making it easy for a developer
to get some protection automatically into their application without having
to add any custom code. For example many ORMs does sanitation of the
input before sending it to the database, thereby preventing SQL-injections.
Other features can be that session-handling is managed in a secure manner
by default. These frameworks are not perfect and while they can have some
features, not every framework have them. So in order to use a web application
framework effectively the developer needs to research what type of security
features the framework contains and which it does not. Another point is that
the framework itself can have bugs or errors making it vulnerable to exploits,
so it is still advisable to have other layers in front of the web application
despite the use of security features in a web application framework. An
example of a framework that has extensively focus on security is OWASP
Enterprise Security API [14].
While there are many approaches to protecting web applications from attacks,
this thesis will not go any further into them. The scope of the thesis is to
compare AppSensor, WAFs and IDPS and while these methods deserve a
mention, they will not be used in the comparison. This is not because they
are not useful, they certainly are, but the scope of the thesis was decided to
leave these methods out to get a better comparison of the other three.
27
Chapter 3
Research Method
This chapter explains how the research questions were answered, why an
experiment was performed and explains how the results was achieved. The
chapter starts with listing up different research methods and strategies for
answering the research questions.
The last part of this chapter will explain how the chosen method, an experi-
ment, was set up and performed. It will walk trough the setup in detail in
order to ensure as much reproducibility as possible.
3.1 Research Strategy
There are many different research strategies. When choosing which types
of strategy to perform, a recap of the research questions is in order. The
research questions will serve as a foundation for which research strategies will
be chosen.
• RQ1: What is the current state of application-based intrusion detection
and prevention systems?
• RQ2: How does OWASP AppSensor compare to other IDPS technolo-
gies?
• RQ3: In the given scenario, what are the benefits of using AppSensors
to stop the attacks compared to a IDPS or web-application firewall?
• RQ4: How hard is it to built AppSensor into an application?
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The first research question is answered with a simple literature review. Because
of the time constraints of the thesis the literature review is not a complete
structured literature review, but a short and simple one. The literature review
gives an overview of the different application-based intrusion detection and
prevention systems, this involves AppSensor, traditional host-based IDPS and
other similar systems. Part of this literature study also helped in classifying
the different types and see both the similarities and the differences with these
systems.
RQ2 is partly answered with a simple theoretical comparison with the basis
from the literature study. This question highlights how AppSensor stand out
from other solutions based on the literature. However since this is only based
on the literature and no studies were found which can approve these claims,
another research strategy to answer this question will also be performed,
it is highlighted in section 3.2. The third research question addresses this
issue directly. The third research question is answered entirely by this other
research strategy chosen and will be explained in more detail later.
The fourth and last research question is best answered by performing an
analysis on either quantitative or qualitative data. However since the thesis
has limited time, this question will be subjectively answered by the research
strategy chosen to answer research question 2 and 3. Since there is not enough
time to perform a proper quantitative or qualitative strategy. The answer to
this question will therefore be very subjective and is a candidate for further
research.
3.2 Different Research Methods
For the overall goal of the thesis there are several different research strategies
that can be used to achieve it. These research strategies along with their
strengths and weaknesses will be gone through in this section. The one chosen
is the one that fits most of the research questions.
3.2.1 Qualitative and Quantitative Strategy
These two methods are well suited for data collecting studies. This involves
questions which can be answered through collecting data in some form, either
through a survey, interviews, workshops and so on. The types of questions
which can be answered are the types of Is there a significant improvement by
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using method A over method B, How is the current state of software security
in the Norwegian industry. Research Questions 4, which asks, how hard is it
to built AppSensor into an application. The word hard here generally means
cost in time needed to implement AppSensor. However the time needed to
implement AppSensor can be quite complex, because it relies on the skill of
the developer, the size of the application, type of detection point and many
other factors. The research questions could have been answered through a
series of interviews or a survey of people using AppSensor as well as other
technologies. However since AppSensor is not widely adopted yet, it would
be difficult to get enough participants, which would give significant results.
This makes it hard to answer any of the research questions with the use of
data collecting methods. Since these methods would be almost impossible to
perform, they will not be used in this thesis. But they could very well have
been used if there was enough data to be obtained.
There are many other types of qualitative and quantitative strategies that
could have been applied if there was any dataset or it was believed that it
would be easy to get the data ourselves. These methods will not be explored
any more in this thesis since it seems that the current stage of AppSensor
implementations are quite few. So far the idea of building sensors or other
application level defenses into an application seems relatively new.
3.2.2 Experiments
Experiments in computer science can be performed much like experiments in
other scientific disciplines. As pointed out in [37] the method is mostly the
same. This method is often called the scientific method [36] and involves a
series of steps, as shown in Figure 3.1, but in for example systems design,
you start with an idea, them perform the system design, make a concrete
implementation and have an experimental evaluation at the end. This however
is mainly just a variant of the classical scientific method suited for example
for systems design.
Experiments is according to this article by Tichy, W.F. [55] encouraged. Fred
Brooks however claims the opposite in [31] which suggested that computer
science is “not a science, but a synthetic, an engineering discipline”. The
argument from Fred Brooks is that computer science is just an engineering
discipline and not a science. This point is argued against by Tichy [55] where
he argues that while computers are made by humans, and not something
pure which can only be observed in a natural form, it can still be studied. He
argues that in order to study lasers, we need to construct lasers, even tough
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Figure 3.1: Scientific Method, from [36]
they do not appear naturally, and that the same principle is with computer
science. The model we can make by studying this laser does not make it
unscientific, quite the opposite. Tichy argues in his paper that experiments
using the traditional scientific form, is both valuable and helps in testing
theories. The traditional scientific approach for experiments is the following.
• Form a hypothesis
• Construct a model and make a prediction
• Design an experiment and collect data
• Analyze results
• If results are satisfactory, propose new theory
Experiments are not proving anything, unlike for example a mathematical
proof[36] but they can be valuable because they test theories in a way so the
experiment might suggest a given theory is wrong. Experiments can also lead
to new insights and suggest new areas of exploration and more research. A
simple experiment can also quickly show if some approach is fruitless or not.
These benefits makes experiments worthwhile in scientific research, but in
order to eliminate error in the experiment, it should be reproducible by other
researchers so an independent researcher can verify the results in order to
minimize the amount for errors in the experiment.
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A weakness with experiments is that almost all experiments are, as Paul
Feyerabend points out in his book [38], theory contaminated. This means
that sometimes the experiment is made to fit the theory it is testing. This
makes it hard to tell if the experiment is just a self fulfilling prophecy or if it
actually is objective enough to be able to either help in confirming the theory
or find holes in the theory. In order to have the experiments be as objective
as possible it needs to be done with as few variables as possible, and the
environment must be examined carefully before the experiment takes place.
This is one of the reasons why experiments are important to be reproducible.
The importance is mentioned by both, Tichy [55], Feitelson [37] and by
Dodig-Crnkovic [36].
The arguments above suggests that an experiment should be reproducible
by others and shall try to be as objective as possible and not be influence
too much by the theory, however this is in its nature not avoidable as a total.
The experiment performed in this thesis tries to a great extend to fulfill these
criteria as much as possible.
3.2.3 Chosen Research Method
The two main methods which is pointed out above are quite different, but
both can be used to answer some of the research questions. The experiment
fits very well with research question 2 and 3, but not so well with 4. While
the quantitative and qualitative methods fits very well for number 4, it does
not fit that well with 2 and 3. The chosen method is therefore to perform
an experiment; with the note that research question 4 will only be answered
very subjectively in this thesis.
As the above section points out, an experiment should try to be as reproducible
as possible so that other researchers can verify the results. It should also
try to be as objective as possible with regards to theory. The experiment
made and performed in this thesis goes to great length to try to achieve these
properties.
3.3 Experiment Description
The experiment will be performed in a simulated environment. A scenario that
involves a web-application for a fictional banking company will be created, and
a set of attacks will be carried out against the web-application. The scenario
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Table 3.1: Virtual Server Environment Specifications
Operating System Ubuntu Server 11.10
Webserver Apache 2.2
WAF ModSecurity 2.6
IDPS Snort 2.8.5
Java Runtime Environment OpenJDK 6
Java Web Application Server Tomcat 7
Database Server SQlite 3.7.7
Attack system Backtrack Linux 5 R2
is described in detail in chapter 4. The attacks are described in chapter 5
so they are performed the same way each time and are easily reproducible.
Since there are no general purpose WAF or IDPS systems, some concrete
ones will be used. The choices are ModSecurity [9] which is a module to the
Apache Webserver [1] as a WAF and Snort [23] as an IDPS. These choices
are mainly made because they are quite big and dominant in the field, and
also open source and therefore free of charge to use.
The whole setup will only use one computer with several virtual machines.
The virtual machines technology used is Oracle Virtualbox, which hosts both
the virtual server, the web application and other protection mechanisms and
the machine used for the attacks. This provides several advantages as shown
in the section below.
3.3.1 Environment for the Experiment
The experiment will be conducted on a virtual machine acting as a server for
the scenario website. The specification for the environment is listed in Table
3.1.
The environment is run on a virtual machine to be easy to set up and the
whole virtual machine can be distributed for other researchers wanting to
verify the test results or try other attacks against the environment. The usage
of virtual machines also has the ability to take snapshots, so in case anything
is changed during the testing it is easy to revert back to the previous version
and always have a predictable starting point. Another big advantage is that
the experiment can be done on an internal virtual network. The network
only consists of two machines, the attack machine and the server running
the web application and all the security layers. This helps in isolating the
server running the web application from all other traffic on the internet and
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prevent for example internet background radiation[46] to interfere with the
experiment.
3.3.2 Setup of Snort
Snort is installed from the package repository that comes default with ubuntu
11.10. To make the experiment easier, Snort is only configured to be an IDS
and only report anomalies and events that it detects and not respond to them.
This way it is easy to see if Snort blocks an attack and the attack would still
pass through Snort to the next layer of defense. By doing this it is easy to
observe that Snort could blocked the attack, but since it is only an IDS it
lets the attack pass trough and there is no need to turn Snort off in order to
reach into the next security layer with the attack.
The configuration of Snort is the default configuration it comes with. Note
here that this is the default configuration from the ubuntu package and that
the official Snort download from Sourcefire might be different. The default
configuration contains many rules for web-based attacks so Snort should be
able to detect some of the attacks that will be performed. Snort is configured
to use a MySQL database to store its findings. By storing it in a MySQL
database it is easy to have an event analysis system using the database to
show the different attacks that Snort detects. In addition to the default
configuration, the HTTP-inspect preprosessor is configured to better suite
the scenario, by using the apache profile.
To monitor the events which is recorded by Snort, a system called BASE
(Basic Analysis and Security Engine) is chosen. It monitors the Snort database
and can show the different events happening in Snort through a web gui. This
is only to make it easy to see which events is flagged as anomalous by Snort.
3.3.3 Setup of ModSecurity
Modsecurity is, just like Snort, also installed from the ubuntu package repos-
itory. The version is 2.6.0 which is the newest 2.x number release of Mod-
Security. The core ruleset which is now an OWASP project is also installed,
featuring version 2.2.0 of the ruleset. From the core ruleset only the base
rules are enabled. Just like Snort, Modsecurity is set up to only detect and
not respond to any threats. This makes it possible for attacks to pass through
Modsecurity and only be reported in the apache server logs. Just as with
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Snort Modsecurity could have blocked the attack, but it is configured to only
be reported and then pass through.
Modsecurity can use custom rules that can be tailored to the web application
and traffic for a specific site. One example of such a rule is at a webshop site,
which have a shopping cart and an amount to pay. A Modsecurity rule, which
check if the amount to pay is a positive number, and will alert if there is a
negative amount of money in the shopping cart. These kinds of rules have to
be custom for an application but it makes Modsecurity able to understand
some of the web applications context just like AppSensor.
The Core Rule Set is an Open Source Ruleset maintained by OWASP [53].
The Rule Set uses a negative security model for web applications. This means
that the Core Rule Set only detects traffic that are suspicious and otherwise
allows everything. This is opposed to a positive security model where nothing
but a few chosen set of traffic patterns are allowed. The reason for the Core
Rule Set using a negative security model is that it is supposed to be as
generic as possible, and the false positive rate would be too high if a generic
Rule Set tried to specify which behavior was allowed by a specialized web
application. The white paper from OWASP[53] also explains some benefits
by using ModSecurity for detecting web application attacks compared to for
example Snort which can intercept HTTP-traffic but does not contain as
much flexibility in its rule language as ModSecurity does when it comes to
HTTP-traffic.
To check the audit log of ModSecurity an application called AuditViewer
by JWall [7] is being used. It makes it easier to analyze and look at the
logs generated by ModSecurity and also performs grouping of events that are
similar. This application has nothing to do with the setup of the experiment
and is just a standalone logviewer application to make it easier to see the
results from ModSecurity.
3.3.4 Building in the Detection Points
When building in the detection points in the application, the reference imple-
mentation of AppSensor from OWASP was used which is hosted on Google
Code [4]. The choice of using this implementation was to make it easier
for other to reproduce the results, but also to lower the amount of custom
implementation needed. However for some projects the reference implementa-
tion is neither sufficient, nor complying with the standards of the project or
simply not in the same language that a given project is written in. So there
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is probably many projects which takes the idea of OWASP AppSensor, but
makes their own implementation of it. This could certainly have been done
in this experiment, but in order to have it be reproducible and as close to the
OWASP AppSensor projects ideas, the reference implementation was chosen.
The reference implementation is not a complete drop in framework, because
the detection points and response mechanisms still need to be built into
the application. The reference framework handles all the detection points
and when they are triggered, it collects them and perform the appropriate
responses based on the security policy file, which is a Java properties file. So
even tough the reference implementation is used, it only provides a way to
build in the detection points and response mechanisms, they still need to be
built in manually.
The detection points that were build into the application is covered by the list
given in [32], however there were some specific for the scenario application.
The detection points are only configured to log events that happen and there
are currently no other action the application is able to do other than detecting
and logging the attacks. This was mainly because the main comparison will
focus on how well AppSensor compares with an IDPS and WAF in terms of
detection. However some attention to actions will also be given later in the
comparison, but at a theoretical level.
Table 3.2: Which detection points where implemented
Which detection point Implemented
Unexpected HTTP Commands Yes
Attempts To Invoke Unsupported HTTP Methods Yes
GET When Expecting POST Yes
POST When Expecting GET Never occur in
application
Use Of Multiple Usernames Yes
Multiple Failed Passwords No
High Rate Of Login Attempts Yes
Unexpected Quantity Of Characters In Username Partly
Unexpected Quantity Of Characters In Password Partly
Unexpected Types Of Characters In Username No
Unexpected Types Of Characters In Password No
Providing Only The Username Yes
Providing Only The Password Yes
Adding Additional POST Variables Yes
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Which detection point Implemented
Removing POST Variables Yes
Modifying Existing Cookies Yes
Adding New Cookies Yes
Deleting Existing Cookies No
Substituting Another User’s Valid Session ID Or
Cookie
Yes
Source IP Address Changes During Session Yes
Change Of User Agent Mid Session Yes
Modifying URL Arguments Within A GET For
Direct Object Access Attempts
Yes
Modifying Parameters Within A POST For Direct
Object Access Attempts
Yes
Force Browsing Attempts Yes
Evading Presentation Access Control Through Cus-
tom Posts
Yes
Cross Site Scripting Attempt Yes
Violations Of Implemented White Lists No
Double Encoded Characters No
Unexpected Encoding Used No
Blacklist Inspection For Common SQL Injection
Values
Yes
Detect Abnormal Quantity Of Returned Records. No
Null Byte Character In File Request No file requests
Carriage Return Or Line Feed Character In File
Request
No file requests
Detect Large Individual Files No file requests
Detect Large Number Of File Uploads No file requests
Irregular Use Of Application Yes
Speed Of Application Use Yes
Frequency Of Site Use Yes
Frequency Of Feature Use Yes
High Number Of Logouts Across The Site Yes
High Number Of Logins Across The Site Yes
High Number Of Same Transaction Across The
Site
Yes
The Table 3.2 gives an overview for which detection points from the default
OWASP list was implemented. These detection points are fairly generic and
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can apply to most web applications. They detect a number of generic web
application attacks, monitors trends in authentication and site usage. This
is features nearly every web application has and is much the same across
applications. One assumption which can be made is that every web application
that uses OWASP AppSensor, either the reference implementation or their
own, will use these detection points, since they are fairly universal and well
documented by OWASP. However, as can be seen from the Table 3.2 some
of the detection points did not apply for the simplebank web application.
Because features like file upload or download is not used in that application,
but others like the detection of multiple failed passwords would require a
rewrite of the authentication method.
The unexpected quantity in the username and password detection points have
been marked as partly in the table, the reason for this is that there is hard
to have numbers on what is an unexpected quantity. Since the simplebank
website is really insecure it does not have any restrictions on how short the
password can be, and setting an upper limit is also hard. Off course people
do not manually type in a 100 character password, but a password manager
program might use a 100 characters or more. In the scenario the limits where
set to a minimum of 2, which is far to low, and a maximum of a 100, which
is reasonable. However the most useful thing to detect here is probably that
an attacker is not trying ridiculous small passwords, which are smaller than
the web application require, nor that the passwords are to big, hence making
the HASH-algorithm taking a lot of CPU-power and in effect producing a
denial of service attack.
Unexpected types of characters in the username and the password input
means that an attacker for example sends a username, which is outside the
ASCII range or other predetermined ranges of allowed characters. The same
applies for passwords; if there are some characters that are not allowed, like
carriage return line feed or some other special signs in the passwords. The
problem for the simplebank is that it has no limitations either to the username
or to the password. A detection point would therefore easily be generating
false positives by detecting values that should be accepted by the simplebank
application. When it comes to cookie detection, two points were omitted.
Since the simplebank application does not have many cookies other than
the session cookie, it is hard to tell if a user is deleting any other cookies or
deleting the session cookie, which would happen if he closes his web browser.
Encoding and detecting both unknown encodings, double encoding or wrong
encodings have not been implemented in this application mostly due to time
constraints and difficulty of implementing it reliably. These were also omitted
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from the OWASP AppSensor projects example applications.
One important point is that all of these detection points have been imple-
mented manually in the application and is therefore subject to coding errors
and bugs just like any other feature in a web application. However, this can
also be true for any IDPS system or WAF. This is the reason why having
multiple redundant security features often can be a good thing, because an
error in one does not necessarily have to be an error in another.
3.3.5 Using the Detection Points
The detection points are using the OWASP AppSensor framework which
handles the storage and possibly the actions of the detection points. In the
simplebank application the detection points are being stored in memory by
the reference implementation, this means that when the application restarts
all the events that have been detected are deleted. In the OWASP AppSensor
developers guide there is specific recommendation to make a better imple-
mentation of the storage so that the exceptions are stored in database or
somewhere else persistent. However for this experiment the in memory storage
is good enough and makes it easy to start the experiment with a clean slate
if it needs to be repeated.
OWASP AppSensor also supports response actions which are actions the
application can perform when certain thresholds are met from the detection
points. For example if a user have tried 5 cross-site scripting attempts the user
is banned from the application for a certain time period. Another example
can be if the application detects an increase in the usage of a certain feature,
for example a status update on a social website, the application can disable
that feature until an administrator can figure out what is wrong. These
response action where not used in this experiment since the experiment is
about detection, not how the application can take actions against the attack.
Therefore the simplebank AppSensor only logs what it detects and performs
no other actions.
3.3.6 Execution of the Experiment
Since the purpose of the experiment is to see how AppSensor compares to
some other defensive mechanisms in terms of web application vulnerabilities,
the experiment will perform each of the attack in turn. Each attack will record
were it was detected, if anywhere, and since the mechanisms are configured to
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only detect, the attack will pass on through. When the attack has been carried
out, the logs for each of the three defense mechanisms is checked. Where the
attack was detected is written down and the next attack is executed.
Between each attack the environment will be reset, in practice meaning that
the virtual machine will be rolled back to the state before the attack. This is
to prevent the attacks from interfering with each other and at the same time
keep the environment the same during each of the attacks. This is to make
the results as isolated as possible and also making the experiment easier to
be reproduced. The order of the attacks therefore becomes irrelevant and it is
easy to change the order or perform new attacks from a steady state later on.
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Chapter 4
Scenario and Experiment
This chapter will describe the scenario that is created to compare the three
different methods,
The scenario used here is generic and the web application is also very simple
and generic and it is made so that some simple attacks which are based on
the OWASP top ten can be carried out against a website.
4.1 Business Case
The business case is a simple bank, which is called simplebank. The bank
does all its customer interaction over a website and have it as the sole point
of the business. The choice of a simple banking website was done by request
from BEKK, but it is a simple website that represents a general website
with some business value it needs to protect. The website have the following
functionality which is essential for the bank business:
• Register new customers
• Login registered customers
• Make new accounts for customers
• Transfer money from a customer account to other accounts
These functions is what the banking website is able to do. It is very simple
but still has enough functionality so the attacks can be carried out against
it. In addition there is a way for the administrator account to look at all the
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user accounts which are stored on the system. A more detailed description of
the website is given in Subsection 4.1.1 below.
4.1.1 Description of the Bank Web Site
The bank web site features a login form, which lets a user log into his
user account on the banking web site. When inside, the user can create
new accounts for himself and create and look at existing bank accounts he
currently has. Since this is a simple scenario, the user is able to insert money
out of nowhere into his accounts, so he is able to get some initial funds.
This would normally not be possible and would be considered a big flaw
with the application. The user is also able to perform transactions from his
accounts to other accounts, either owned by him or other customers in the
bank. Screenshots of the simplebank application is included in Appendix B
The bank will be coded to be vulnerable, meaning that for example there
will be no validation of the database input, it will go straight down to the
database. For example the username forms field, it will be vulnerable to
many injection-vulnerabilities since there will be no input sanitation. This is
to make is easy to exploits the application and make the application rely on
either third-party systems such as an IDPS, WAF or the built in AppSensors
to prevent the attacks. In reality a web application would, hopefully, be
designed much more secure by default, but for this scenario it is easier to have
it be vulnerable and completely dependent on other systems for protection.
4.1.2 Implementation Details
The simplebank is implemented in the Java programming language, with the
Java Enterprise Edition (Java EE) servlets, JSP and other technologies to
make it a web application. Unlike many other Java web application, there
are no frameworks used other than the basic Java EE features. This is
because many frameworks, for example Object-Relational Mappers (ORM)
often prevent SQL-injections, filter output from the application or have other
security features that would prevent the web bank from being vulnerable.
Since the whole point is to have a simple but vulnerable bank the usage of
frameworks were omitted. The usage of the Java programming language was
chosen since the OWASP AppSensor reference implementation is done in Java
and made to be implemented in Java EE web applications. By programming
the simplebank in Java the reference implementation of AppSensor can be
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used and there is no need to make a standalone AppSensor for another
language and/or frameworks.
The bank itself is badly coded; there are almost no tests since it is not critical
that the bank works correctly. One of the points is that it should be poorly
coded to be vulnerable. The functionality of the bank is mostly handled by
Java Servlets, which handles the GET and POST requests from the client.
These are implemented in the Servlet API by simply overriding the doGet
and doPost methods. There are also some pure Java classes in the application.
These pure Java classes are used for the database handling and some other
utilities to avoid that the Servlet classes become too cluttered. When the
doPost or doGet methods are finished running and want to return a result
to the users request, the Java Server Pages technology is used as a template
language. The JSP renders the HTML code that is delivered to the user.
Figure 4.1: Handling of HTTP requests and responses
Figure 4.1 shows how the application works when a HTTP request comes
in from a client and how a response is delivered back to the client. The
application server, which in this case is Jetty [6], is colored in green and the
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servlets, jsp and database/utilities are colored in orange since they contain
the custom code written in the thesis. What happens in Figure 4.1 is that a
request comes in from a browser. The request is first parsed by Jetty which
calls the corresponding servlet. The servlet code then handles the request, and
if needed perform the necessary database and or utilities functions required
for that request. When the servlet is done with the request is handles it to
a jsp template which renders the html which is delivered back to the client
in the HTTP response. The jsp code is only responsible for rendering the
HTTP template and all the data it requires are fetched and delivered to it by
the servlet. While the jsp could perform much more logic, it is more clean
to have most of the logic in the templates and only have the jsp render the
templates, this is only done to make the code easier to read and less tangled.
4.1.3 Attacks
The OWASP top ten will be used as a basis for the attacks against the
simple bank. This is done by request from BEKK. The OWASP top ten,
which currently is from 2010, lists the top ten web based vulnerabilities. A
short overview of the OWASP top ten will be given here with more detailed
description of the attacks is presented in chapter 5.
The OWASP top ten project[48] is a concise, risk focused list of the top ten
most critical web application security risks. The top ten list also describes
each attack and how to defend against them. The top ten list is by no means
a definitive list, it just scratches the surface of web application vulnerabilities
and lists the ten most critical vulnerabilities only. However even tough there
are only ten, it provide a good foundation to compare different ways of
blocking the attacks. These ten are listed in Table 4.1 which is loosely based
on the table from [48].
Table 4.1: The OWASP Top Ten
Attack Description
Injection Injection attacks occur when an application
sends untrusted data to an interpreter. Com-
mon examples are SQL-injection, LDAP-
injection, OS commands, XPath queries and
others.
Continues on next page
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Attack Description
Cross-Site Script-
ing (XSS)
XSS occurs when the web application takes
untrusted data and sends it to a web browser
without validation or escaping, resulting in
the data being executed.
Broken Au-
thentication
and Session
Management
The authentication and session management
is not implemented correctly. Resulting in
that attackers can compromise either pass-
words, keys, session tokens or other flaws.
Insecure Di-
rect Object
References
This happens when an object is not secured
via access control checks. Allowing an at-
tacker to get access to valuable information
such as files, directories or other data.
Cross-Site Re-
quest Forgery
(CSRF)
A CSRF attack uses a users session to send
a forged HTTP request, riding on the logged
in users session. This makes an attacker able
to send requests on behalf of the user.
Security Miscon-
figuration
This point is about the configuration of every-
thing from the application, frameworks, ap-
plication server, web server, database server,
operating system and so on.
Insecure Crypto-
graphic Storage
The web application fails to use cryptographic
storage of sensitive information, making it
easy for an attacker to access or modify
weakly protected data.
Failure to Re-
strict URL Ac-
cess
Many web pages perform URL access rights
before rendering protected links and button.
However, the application need to perform
similar access control each time a page is
accessed to prevent an URL forging to access
the page.
Insufficient
Transport Layer
Protection
The web application fails to authenticate, en-
crypt and protect the confidentiality and in-
tegrity of sensitive network traffic. Making
it easy for an attacker to sniff the sensitive
network traffic.
Continues on next page
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Attack Description
Unvalidated
Redirects and
Forwards
Many web applications use frequently redi-
rects and forward users to other pages and
websites and use untrusted data to determine
the destination pages. Without proper vali-
dation an attacker can redirect an user to a
phising or malware site.
As mentioned above, these are the attacks which will be used when comparing
the different web application security products against each other. In addition
Business logic exploits will be considered. These exploits are not of the same
simple technical nature as for example XSS, which is easy to detect for a
WAF, but it is a way of bypassing authentication, making fraudulent requests
by sending a negative amount of money and so on. All these attacks are
often targeted for a specific application and they exploit flaws in the business
logic of that application. These issues comes in many forms and sizes as
shown by Jeremiah Grossman from Whitehat Security in his whitepaper [40]
and from the presentation by both Grossman and Ford [41]. The OWASP
website contains more details for how to test for business logic attacks [13].
However some business logic exploits can also be some of the attacks from the
OWASP top ten. For example bypass the authorization for a given request on
a web site often would exploit how the application performs access controls
and authentication. A real world example of a business logic attack from
[40] is an online auction. If an online auction website prevented attackers
from guessing the passwords by temporarily locking the user accounts after 5
or more tries in a given amount of time. Once the account was locked the
user must wait 1 hour before the account opens again. An attacker could
exploit this by placing a low bet on an item, and when a user overbid him,
he could first make a slightly higher bid and then attempt to log in with that
user 5 or more times, effectively locking the users account and prevent him
from bidding anymore. This could be exploited to prevent many users from
bidding and the attackers chances of winning the bid increased. One thing
that makes this exploit hard to find is that there is no bug in the code itself,
nor any seemingly dangerous traffic headed for the application.
Business logic exploits can therefore be quite difficult to catch because the
system itself may be coded securely, with proper input sanitation, strong
encryption of sensitive data and protect against many other common attacks
but still have an exploit at the business logic level. Since business logic attacks
are specific to that application there is no way to get a security appliance,
like a WAF for example, and have it prevent the attacks without some serious
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configuration and tuning for that application. While AppSensor can be argued
to be able to detect such attacks one need to consider that the developers
often have to know about such attacks in the first place to be able to detect
and defend against them. This is often not the case, which is why business
logic exploits is hard to detect. However if AppSensor is able to block and
prevent some simple business level exploits, it might prevent the attacker
from ever discovering the true vulnerabilities.
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4.2 Network Configuration
The network configuration is a basic corporate network setup, with a firewall
in front, an inline IDPS system, an inline WAF and an AppSensor-based
web-application running with a web-server in front and application server and
database behind the web-server. A diagram of the network setup is shown in
Figure 4.2. In the network diagram the additional servers is the rest of the
simplebank infrastructure. This might be email, directory or other types of
servers needed by the bank. Since they are part of the attack surface they
are present in the diagram, however since the main focus is web application
security they are not included in detail but only as a cluster of different
servers. Below the different devices in the network diagram will be discussed.
Figure 4.2: Network Diagram for the Scenario
4.2.1 Firewall
The firewall is assumed to be a basic firewall, which are able to block specific
IP-addresses. It is also assumed that only three ports are exposed outside, port
80 for HTTP, port 443 for HTTPS and port 22 for SSH to do administration
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of the server. All other ports are closed for inbound traffic. The firewall
therefore makes for a central point in which all the traffic to the network
have to pass through. Therefore in order to completely block an attacker by
IP-address the attacker must be blocked in this firewall.
4.2.2 IDPS
The IDPS system is placed inline in the traffic flow to the network as shown
in Figure 4.2, meaning that it will serve as the second central point which all
traffic have to pass through. Because of this it receives the same power when
blocking an IP-address as the firewall. This means that the IDPS will block
an IP-address completely from the network if it is blocked in the IDP/IPS. In
many networks one could have the IDPS and firewall be on the same hardware
device, however for the sake of simplicity and to differentiate them they are
separate units in this diagram.
The IDPS system has both a signature, a anomaly-based detection which
detects network anomalies and a stateful-protocol analysis, as explained
in Subsections 2.2.1, 2.2.2 and 2.2.3. Even though this would require a
considerate amount of processing power to do all these things, it is assumed
in this scenario that the IDPS system has ample resources and will not be a
performance bottleneck in the network. For the level in the ISO OSI stack
that the IDPS operates on, it is assumed that it does operate up to level 7.
This means that the IDPS system is able to understand HTTP-traffic. This
makes for an interesting comparison between the WAF, which only focuses on
web application traffic and the IDPS which focuses on all network protocols
including web application protocols. The huge benefit of the IDPS is that
since it understands all the traffic, it can detect attacks which might indirectly
attack the web application. One example of such an attack would be against
the DNS-service, because the web application is useless without DNS.
4.2.3 Web Application Firewall
The web application firewall is also placed in an inline fashion, however it is
only inline with the traffic to the web server. This means traffic that goes
to other servers or workstations do not have to pass through the WAF. The
WAF is assumed to be using a negative security model, which allows all the
requests except the ones that are matched by the blacklist signatures. It is
also assumed that the WAF does traffic normalization before handing the
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traffic over to the web server. Even though the WAF is inline in traffic it has
the same assumption about performance as the IDPS, meaning that it will
not have any impact on performance.
The WAF only operates in level 7 of the ISO OSI model and is able to
intercept TLS-traffic, meaning that the WAF have a copy of the web servers
private and public keys. One thing to note here is that an IDPS system
might also have these keys and be able to intercept TLS traffic, however it is
assumed it cannot. This is done to make it simpler to distinguish between
the WAF and IDPS systems because in reality there are manufacturers which
make products which blurs these boundaries.
One interesting thing to note about the banking industry is that one of
the requirements from the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard
(PCI-DSS) which touches organization running web applications. The re-
quirement about security states that either the web application should have
a vulnerability security assessment or the other option; a web application
firewall should be used in front of the web application, specifically to prevent
attacks such as SQL-injection [54].
4.2.4 Web and Application Server
The web server is a standard web server which does the delivery of web pages,
it also handles caching and serving of static content for the web application,
such as pictures, css and other static content. The web server acts as a reverse
proxy in front of the application server which handles the application itself.
Behind the web server is the application server where the simplebank ap-
plication resides. It communicates with a database server that handles the
database for the web application. The separation between the application
server and database server is done so that there is an external connection to
the database which needs to be secured, as well as to make it easy to scale
with multiple application servers while still have one consistent database.
Requests are forwarded from the web server to the application server and,
after being processed in the application server, are sent back to the web server
before being handled back to the user. The main point here is that the web
server is in front as a reverse proxy and handles static content and some page
caching.
The data flows in the application are shown in a data flow diagram in Figure
4.3. The red dotted lines shows trust boundaries, these are hard to define,
but in this diagram it shows several layers of trust. In an ideal setup each
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Figure 4.3: Data Flow Diagram for the Bank
system would, in addition to having the other layers of protection, not trust
the other systems. For example should the web application system, in a
perfect environment, not trust the data delivered from the WAF or other
proxy servers. In this example however, the web application accepts all types
of data and the sanitation happens further up in the diagram. This shows
that when a HTTP requests comes in it is first handled to the web-server,
when the data leaves the web-server and travels to the application server
it is assumed to be sanitized, meaning that cross-site scripting, injection
attacks and so on should be filtered. The same process is used with encoding
attacks. This assumption could be dangerous, because if an attacker is able
to circumvent the web-server, the application server could be compromised.
As we can see there are many other calls in the diagram, and all these call
could be tampered with or spoofed by an attacker. If the attacker is able to
tamper with the data going to the database server the other layers of defense
on top does not matter. There is no database layer in the dataflow diagram.
This is because the database is hosted on the same server as the application
and there is no external connection to a database server.
The web server will therefore first intercept a typical HTTP request coming
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from a user and if the data is properly sanitized, it will be forwarded to the
application server. The application server will determine what to do with
the request, and will fetch data from the database. When the transaction is
done the result is sent back to the application server which then renders a
response and handles it back to the web server which in the end sends back
the HTTP response to the user. Off course the application server might not
need to query the database, but either way the application server handles the
business logic and makes the response that is sent back to the user through
the web server.
Appsensor detection points are built into the application, making it possible
for the web application itself to detect and prevent attacks. Exactly how
these detection points are built in will be discussed in the next chapter, many
of the detection points from table 2.2 is used.
4.3 Snort as IDPS
Snort is the concrete IDPS system used in the experiment. The definition
from the Snort website:
Snort R© is an open source network intrusion prevention and de-
tection system (IDPS) developed by Sourcefire. Combining the
benefits of signature, protocol, and anomaly-based inspection,
Snort is the most widely deployed IDPS technology worldwide.
With millions of downloads and nearly 400,000 registered users,
Snort has become the de facto standard for IPS.
According to the paper [50] Snort can be used as a network-based IDPS or
a Host-based IDPS system. In the experiment Snort is being deployed as a
Host-based IDPS and monitors all the traffic into that specific host. One of
the big powers of Snort is its rule set, which is huge and updated regularly.
The big disadvantage is that in order to get the latest rules, one has to become
a subscribed member to the Sourcefire Vulnerability Research Team (VRT)
to get the latest rules on new vulnerabilities as soon as they are discovered.
Other users which are registered on the website but does not subscribe to the
rules get them 30 days later. The free for all rule set is updated whenever
Snort has a release. Therefore in this experiment, the rule set used is from
about a month old.
Snort also support the use of preprosessors, these are code which are run to
inspect the traffic before it is handled to the detection engine which goes
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through the rule set which snort uses. There are many Snort preprosesors but
for this thesis, the one named http inspect is probably the most interesting
one. This preprosessor will decode the buffer, find HTTP fields and normalize
them. It works with both HTTP requests and responses. For the experiment
the http inspect preprosessor is setup with the apache profile since that is
the webserver used in the experiment.
4.4 ModSecurity as WAF
ModSecurity is a web application firewall which works as an Apache module.
Since it works as an Apache module it requires Apache to be used as a
webserver. The project has its name from Apache also, since modules for
Apache are generally prefixed with mod before the name, IE mod python and
therefore the web application firewall project was named ModSecurity.
According to the Web Application Security Consortiums Web Application
Firewall Evaluation Criteria [33], ModSecurity is a software only, WAF which
supports both reverse proxy setups as well as embedded setups. ModSecurity
since it is an Apache module get the benefit of Apache decrypting TLS/SSL
traffic and can therefore inspect traffic that have been encrypted with TL-
S/SSL. It also supports both a positive and a negative security model and
this depends on how the user configures ModSecurity.
Just like Snort, ModSecurity have a specific way of dealing with its rule
set and have a commercial offering. ModSecurity have an external OWASP
project called Core Rule Set which provide a set of core rules for ModSecurity.
In addition to these rules Trustwave Spiderlabs, which is the company behind
ModSecurity, have their own commercial rules. From the ModSecurity FAQ,
the differences between the rule set are explained:
The OWASP ModSecurity CRS security model is based on the
concept of ”generic attack detection” which means that it analyzes
all HTTP transactional data looking for malicious payloads. While
this technique does provide a base level of protection, there are still
accuracy issues since the CRS does not correlate specific attack
vector locations (such as URL and parameters) from publicly
disclosed vulnerabilities. The ModSecurity Rules from Trustwave
SpiderLabs focuses on specific attack vector locations, creating
custom virtual patches for public vulnerabilities.
In the experiment, just like with Snort, the free core rule set will be used.
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One of the biggest differences between ModSecurity and many other WAF-
products is that ModSecurity is an Apache module, and therefore needs
Apache in order to run. Many other WAF are standalone, either physical
appliances or software which can be run standalone and does not need any
other webserver. Another point is the different points of operations, and what
types of security policies they will support.
4.5 AppSensor Implementation
To implement the AppSensor detection points in the application the reference
implementation of OWASP AppSensor which is up on google code [4] was
used. In addition the table in [32] which mentions the different detection
points was used as a basis for which detection points where to be implemented.
There are off course many other sensors and detection points that can and
should be implemented in an application, however since this was the official
table from OWASP, it was used as a basis for the implementation in the
experiment. The table in [32] does only cover general web attacks, since it is
not feasible to develop a table for every type of custom web application out
there. Still there are some attacks which are left out in the table that could
still be considered to be general web application attacks, such as Cross Site
Request Forgery.
The way the detection points are implemented is by simply triggering a new
AppSensor intrusion with an AppSensor exception as the argument. Some
of these detection points are implemented in an aspect oriented manner,
which in this experiment meant implementing them as filters for the different
Servlets of the application. However some of the detection points, like for
example those regarding authentication where implemented by mixing it
in with the business logic. Often it is desirable to implement many of the
detection points aspect oriented since that simplifies the maintainability of
the detection points. The detection points that were not implemented as part
of the business logic were implemented as filters in the Java environment.How
filters work is explained in Figure 4.4. In the figure a request that is incoming
is put through a series of filters, depending on the destination of the request.
These filters can then perform for example detection of cross site scripting, or
SQL-injection in all the forms destined for the application itself. This way all
the detection points regarding cross site scripting or SQL-injection is handled
in one place instead of being all over the rest of the business logic.
In the experiment there really was two places were the detection points were
54
Figure 4.4: Java EE Requests and responses with Filters
implemented, it was some in filters which scanned all traffic before handling
the control to the servlet, and there were some detection points embedded
with the business logic. There are many other ways that detection points
could have been implemented but one trend is that some points are only
needed at a few places in the application, such as the detection point which
alert of a large money transfer, or multiple usernames tried. Other need to be
done for every input field, every cookie, or every request to check the headers,
these detection points are much easier to implement in a filter or other way
which intercepts every request to the web application, much the same way as
a WAF does. Because of these different requirements the detection points
were implemented in a different manner.
Implementing the detection points, at least most of those supplied with
OWASP AppSensor document, is not a difficult job. Many of these points
however, may need some functionality, which not all web applications have.
For example a way of getting the user agent and IP-address used in a ses-
sion. In those cases some of the detection points would be more difficult to
implement because the need to implemented extra functionality need to be
performed. This might not be a huge problem, but depending on the type of
application and frameworks used, it could prove time consuming. There is
also quite easy to simple not implement certain detection points which proves
challenging, especially if they are not really critical detection points to have.
One nice side effect of implementing detection points in an application, is
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that whenever a detection point is implemented, the developer have to be
concerned with how to make the potential vulnerability safe. For example, if a
detection point which checks incoming traffic for cross site scripting attempts,
the developer also need to make sure to sanitize and prevent the cross site
scripting attack from happening as well as detecting it. This point is not
true with all the detection points. For example the detection point which
detects a change of user agent in the middle of a session with the site does
not necessarily mean an attack or that the site is vulnerable to anything, it is
merely some suspicious behavior which in conjunction with other suspicions
events could be an attacker trying to attack the application.
There is a drawback by having to implement these detection points, and that
is the interference from other frameworks. The experiment did not use any
framework and very few libraries, this was both to keep the application simple,
but also to prevent these frameworks from filtering and sanitizing the input.
Many web application frameworks already does a lot of sanitizing of input
and other security features, this might make it hard to have the detection
points actually getting their hands on the raw input to the web application
since all that might be exposed to the programmer from these frameworks
are the sanitized data which are already safe and therefore potential attack
on the web application have already been averted and AppSensor never got
any chance of detecting the attack. The same problem can happen if a WAF
or IDPS is used which manipulates the traffic before sending it to the web
application.
4.6 Drawbacks with the Scenario
There are several drawbacks with this scenario with regards to comparing
IDPS, WAF and AppSensor. One of the biggest drawbacks is that the scenario
will only have a few attacks, although these are some very common attacks,
the scenario is not big enough to consider many other types of attacks, such
as LDAP-injection, or tampering with data going into a Enterprise Service
Bus and so on. The bank itself is also very basic and a realistic bank would
contain much more functionality and therefore a bigger attack surface.
When it comes to the network, it will be simulated using a virtual machine
and a host-based IDPS and host-based WAF and AppSensor implemented
into the application itself. The WAF will be a reverse proxy which will be
on the same host. The web application will therefore run on the same host
but will use the WAF as a reverse proxy. This makes the network not a real
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network, which would probably have a network-based IDPS and the WAF
could be implemented as a reverse proxy which could be standalone from the
web application server. The vulnerability that could be used by an attacker
in a standalone WAF is that an attacker could attack the connection going
from the WAF to the web application server. If the WAF filters the traffic to
prevent an attack, the attacker could tamper with the data going from the
WAF to the web application to enable the attack again. These kind of attacks
is probably infeasible since all the different network appliances is running on
the same machine.
The last drawback is that since the scenario requires an actual IDPS, WAF
and AppSensor implementation, there can be errors in the products tested. As
mentioned earlier, many IDPS can understand HTTP-protocol and therefore
do much of the work which a WAF can do, and there are also different
functionality in different IDPS and WAF products. This makes it difficult to
find a clear distinction between the products and even though the intention is
to test a general IDPS and WAF, there is no such thing as a general IDPS and
WAF. The testing must therefore use an actual product which satisfies the
criteria for an IDPS and a WAF. Another difficulty is the cost of the product,
many products are huge and expensive and are made to be implemented in a
huge network. Often these are integrated packages with both a network-based
IDPS, a wireless IDPS and a SIEM solution that integrates all the information
gathered from the different sensors. Since the scenario is quite simple it will
be difficult to test these solutions. Another problem is the cost in money,
these big solutions are quite expensive and this thesis project does not have
the money to buy them just for this testing.
4.7 Scenario Summary
The scenario is a simple bank, which only have a web site as their customer
interface. The web site is therefore critical in the operation of the bank
itself. The scenario is a fairly common setup of a web application with both
a IDPS and WAF inline in the network traffic. The web application has one
proxy, the webserver with the WAF, which handles some of the load and
some extra security. Behind all the layers of the security is the application
server and database. This is where the crown jewels reside and is therefore
hidden behind all the other layers of defense. The web application for the
bank is also written to be insecure, so that it is vulnerable to all the different
attacks presented in chapter 5.
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Chapter 5
Attacks
This chapter goes trough the different attacks which will be performed on
the simplebank website. This chapter will show how the attacks is performed
and contain all the details for the various attacks. It will explain the attacks
in great detail so others can easily carry them out.
5.1 Injection Attacks
This is the injection attack from OWASP top ten guide. The experiment will
only take the simplest one and perform them, because they are some of the
most used ones according to OWASP top ten guide. They are also easy to
perform by hackers. Some of the other types of injection attacks, like for
example command injection or LDAP-injection will not be used here, both
because they are a little less common but also because the application does
not communicate with any LDAP-servers nor uses any OS-commands.
5.1.1 SQL-Injection
The injection attack that will be performed on the simplebank is a SQL-
injection. This attack injects SQL code that can manipulate queries against
the database. This attack is successful since the simplebank website passes
the raw input data directly to the SQL-database. This means that something
that is completely innocent in a HTML-context, is quite harmful and will be
interpreted by the SQL-database.
58
Simplebank have performed their authentication of users by simply taking
the input from the username and password field and sending it directly to a
SQL query shown in the listing 5.1.
SELECT username , password
FROM use r s
WHERE username = ’” + username + ” ’
AND password = ’” + password + ” ’ ;
Listing 5.1: Shows the SQL-query executed when user logs in
The username and password being used in the query is the ones which are in
the input fields from the simplebank web application. They are not filtered
and therefore the database server will execute the SQL-commands contained
in them. An attacker can exploit this by for example putting ’ or ’1’ = ’1
into the password field. This will cause the AND clause in the SQL query to
always become true and the attacker can authenticate as any user without
knowing their password.
This is the statement used in the experiment to perform a SQL-injection.
It is injected in the password field in the login form for in the simplebank
application. A valid username is enterer in the username field and ’ or ’1’ =
’1 in entered in the password field.
5.2 Cross Site Scripting
Cross Site Scripting, often shortened XSS, is a very typical attack on web
applications. Cross Site Scripting is about tricking a web application to let
a users browser run javascript code inserted by the attacker [25]. This can
be performed either reflected or stored [16]. A stored attack is stored in the
web applications database or other storage and then served up to the user. A
reflected attack cross site scripting is reflected of the target website, but runs
in the websites context. The reflected attack often needs to send the victim a
URL which is carefully crafted to exploit the cross site scripting vulnerability.
Cross site scripting is one the most popular attacks on the internet, both for
attackers to prove that there is a cross site scripting vulnerability with a cross
site scripting payload which is not harmful such as the one above. There
are even several sites which collects cross site scripting attacks, for example
this subreddit at Reddit [19] and another website which points out cross site
scripting attacks [27]. These websites shows the popularity of the cross site
scripting vulnerability.
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Figure 5.1: Showing Cross Site Scripting on the simplebank
The cross site scripting attack is performed through an input field in the web
application there will be inserted a script tag which will contain Javascript
code. This code will run when a user later requests the content for that page.
The code used for the experiment is shown in listing 5.2.
<s c r i p t>a l e r t (”XSS”)</s c r i p t>
Listing 5.2: Shows simple demonstration of Cross Site Scripting
This attack is carried out on the page where a user can create an account.
The input field that lets a user create an account and assign a name to that
account will be exploited and the above code is injected as the account name.
This field allow arbitrary characters to be used as input and does not filter
them either on the way in or the way out. A demonstration of the attack
is shown in Figure 5.1. This attack can be used against the simplebank to
for example letting an attacker utilize Javascript to read out the contents
of the cookie being used in the session. By getting his hands on the session
cookie an attacker can impersonate the user and perform a fraud by collecting
money from the users account. The attack described above is the one being
performed in the experiment.
5.3 Broken Authentication and Session Man-
agement
Broken authentication and session management is quite a broad area of
vulnerability from the OWASP top ten [15]. It covers anything from the
initial login, to the handling of a user session to how the username and
passwords are stored.
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5.3.1 Authentication
As seen in Section 5.1.1 an SQL-injection can be used to bypass the password
check of the simplebank website, thus breaking the authentication scheme.
The authentication is also weakly implemented and will allow as short a
password from a user as the user wants, meaning that a password with one
character is perfectly acceptable for the simplebank.
The authentication is also just one factor, while financial institutions in Amer-
ica is advised to use multifactor authentication [34]. The simplebank wanted
it to be easy for its customers and therefore have single factor authentication.
This makes it easier for an attacker to brute force the authentication scheme
for the simplebank.
Another error the simplebank has made is that it is storing the passwords
in plain text. This means that if an attacker is able to compromise the
database, the attacker would get all the plain text passwords for the users at
the simplebank website and can easily impersonate any of them.
Since there already is a way t bypass the authentication of the simplebank
with the SQL-injection. The attack that is performed from this category from
OWASP top ten is within the realm of session management and described
below.
5.3.2 Session Management
The simplebank website uses a session cookie for tracking an authenticated
users session across the website. The cookie is simple and has the username
that is logged in as its value. This means that there are several ways an
attacker can compromise this. One method is to change the value of the cookie
to another username. This would make it trivially to impersonate another
user by simply changing the session cookie value to be other users username.
Another approach would be to forge a false session cookie, by simply creating
a cookie with the correct name and have another users username as value.
The attacker could then impersonate any user whose username was known,
this is shown in Figure5.2. This is the attack performed in the experiment.
In the experiement a cookie which is shown in Figure 5.2 was created and
allowed an attacker to bypass the authentication mechanism of the simplebank
website. This was performed by creating the cookie and thereafter access the
accountoverview page which requires a valid session. These steps are the ones
performed in the experiment.
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Figure 5.2: Creating a new session cookie
In addition even if the session cookie did not contain the usernames and
would be infeasible to forge, it is still sent over normal HTTP and therefore
not encrypted while in transit. This means that if an attacker could sniff and
get the cookie he could use that cookie to impersonate that exact user. This
works even if a correct implementation by session cookies is done because the
cookie needs to be protected in transit.
5.4 Insecure Direct Object References
An insecure direct object reference is when the web application allows direct
access to an object, which should normally be inaccessible for that user. This
types of attacks can be of varying degree of impact on the business and really
depends on which type of resource is accessed. The types of resources can be
anything from files, to directories or other data. The simplebank have very
few static files, but they have a readme file. This readme file contains some
sensitive information about the setup of the simplebank website and should
therefore not be exposed to an attacker. Unfortunately the simplebank only
have access control for the get-requests to the pages that have servlets, since
the README file is served directly by the application server it does not have
any servlet and therefore lacks access control.
One of the attacks which is carried out is just directly downloading this
readme file without have performed any authentication. When the attack is
performed all the cookies are purged from the browser and the browser is
restarted so that all session cookies are flushed out. Then the url where the
readme file is accessed directly and the readme opens in the browser.
Another type of direct object reference can be access control errors. In the
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Figure 5.3: Tamperdata tampering with the transfer money request
simplebank there is a page which allows a user to transfer money from one of
his account to another account in the system. However if the user submits
another account instead of his own, the simplebank fails to check if that
account belongs to the user and therefore happily performs the transaction
for him. This means that a user can take money from another account and
insert to his own. This attack works since the web application does not check
that the data from the user is valid, it only assumes that since it sends our
valid data, valid data will be returned.
The way this attack is carried out is by using the tamperdata plugin for firefox
[24] and intercept the request going from the client to the server. The id of
the bank accounts is changed to something that fits the attack and allows the
data to be sent. This is shown in Figure 5.3. When the attack is carried out
two users are created in the simplebank website, one with username test and
another with username pentest. Both users create one account each, where
the account ids become 1 for the pentest user and 2 for the test user. The
pentest user then makes a request which he uses tamperdata with so that he
transfers money from the account with id 2 to his own account which has id
1. This should not be allowed but since the simplebank does not check the
data, which is sent back the user pentest is able to make the transfer.
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5.5 Cross-site Request Forgery
Cross-site request forgery[42] happens when a user visit a malicious page
which uses the users already established session with the simplebank website
to send a post-request to the simplebank website, riding on the users session
behind. This attack lets an attacker perform transactions behind the users
back to his own account.
To perform a simple cross-site request forgery attack against the simplebank
website, a simple form was created on another website, shown in Listing 5.3.
<form ac t i on =”http : / / 1 0 . 0 . 2 . 2 : 8 0 8 0 / simplebank/Trans fe r ”
name=”transferMoney ” method=”POST”>
<input name=”fromAccount” type=”hidden” value=”1”>
<input name=”amount” type=”hidden” value=”100”>
<input name=”toAccount” type=”hidden” value=”8”>
</form>
<s c r i p t type=”text / j a v a s c r i p t”>
window . onload=document . transferMoney . submit ( ) ;
</s c r i p t>
Listing 5.3: Cross Site Request Forgery site
The IP-address is the address to where the simplebank website is running and
the path is to where the simplebank accepts the transfer money form. This
form gets submitted when a user visits the site and transfer 100 money from
account 1 to account 8, assuming that account 1 is the victim and account 8
is the attackers account. The code above would therefore be on a malicious
webpage and when a user who is already logged in to the simplebank via
another browser tab visits the malicious page, the form will be submitted
and the users browser would send the session cookie along with it, thereby
transferring money to the attacker.
Since cross-site request forgery is a general type of attack it can be used to
send any valid form from a malicious page to the vulnerable page. For the
simplebank the most obvious thing to do is the form shown above, which
transfers money from one account to another. Another attack could be to
submit another form, such as the register user form or the create account
form. The register user form can be used to create a new user and the create
account form can be used to create another account. None of these forms
would do much harm to the simplebank, other than that customers might be
upset if they suddenly get accounts they did not create themselves.
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5.6 Security Misconfiguration
Security Misconfiguration is a broad point on the OWASP top ten, it spans
from web server , application server to database configuration. In addition, it
also spans the usage of frameworks and libraries. This makes it a very broad
point which goes beyond the application itself. It is very important that every
part of the web application stack is secured, because nothing is more secure
than the weakest link. In the experiment the focus is on the web application
itself and not so much upon the whole stack needed. This is one of the places
where defense systems which are not only protecting the application, but all
the things around like for example a network-based IDPS system or a WAF.
These systems could be able to detect a cross site scripting attack on one
of the underlying libraries that AppSensor have no way of reaching into to
detect what is going on.
However since this is such a broad point and also often outside the web appli-
cation itself, these types of vulnerabilities where omitted from the experiment.
The point is included here because it is quite important, but it falls outside
the scope of the experiment in the thesis, since there is little AppSensor can
do outside the application.
5.7 Insecure Cryptographic Storage
Sensitive data is not always encrypted or stored securely. This can be anything
from simple password hashes to other sensitive information that should be
encrypted or stored in a hashed form. According to OWASP top ten the
most typical mistakes made here are unsafe key generation and storage, not
rotating keys and use a weak algorithm are common mistakes. Using a weak
hash function or not salting is also common mistakes.
In the simplebank application there are two sensitive information fields stored
in the database about a user. The first thing is the password, which is stored
in plain text, used for login. The second field is the ”something secret” field,
this is to illustrate a piece of sensitive information, like a social security
number, account number and so on which should be stored encrypted but is
not. Both these fields are stored as plain text meaning that if an attacker can
compromise the database, the attacker then has free access to this sensitive
information for all the users. Since these types of attacks require an attacker
to compromise the database, they are relative hard to execute, but if the
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site is vulnerable to a SQL-injection, the attacker might be able to get the
sensitive data.
This vulnerability itself is often not an exploit in itself, but often used in
conjunction with other vulnerabilities for an attacker to get access to the
data. It is therefore not tested in the scenario since there is no single attack
that can be performed, but rather a consequence of an attack.
5.8 Failure to Restrict URL Access
By not properly restricting URL access an attacker could get access to an
URL he is not authorized to access. This could happen if the URL contains no
access control or wrong access control. For example wrong access control could
be a page that only administrators of the application should be able to access
suddenly is accessible to regular users. The severity of this type of attack is
dependent upon the type of website the attacker is able to access. This can
be anything from severely damaging the business goals to an embarrassing
mistake that is no big deal.
The simplebank application have added access control to all their GET-
requests, but they have forgotten to add access control to their POST-requests.
This makes it easy for an attacker to post a form to any url on the simplebank
website even though the user does not have access to it or is anonymous.
This makes it possible for an attacker to perform a transaction without being
logged in as the user where the money is transfered from; they only need to
know their account number.
Since the simplebank does not have access control for their POST-request, a
simple command with CURL can perform a POST-request which can transfer
money from one account to another on the simplebank website. Listing 5.4
demonstrates the CURL command that will transfer 1000 money from account
1 to account 6. This is the attack performed in the experiment and the curl
command is used.
cu r l −d ’ fromAccount=6’ −d ’ amount=1000 ’
−d ’ toAccount=1’ l o c a l h o s t :8080/ simplebank/Trans fe r
Listing 5.4: Curl command for a POST-request
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5.9 Insufficient Transport Layer Security
Insufficient transport layer security generally means that web sites do not
use protection on the transport layer. Typically this means that a web site
either do not use SSL/TLS or have improper handling of SSL/TLS. Improper
handling would typically be a site which has only part of it protected by SSL
and letting sensitive data such as session cookies or other information pass in
the clear. The main difficulty for an attacker is to be able to sniff the traffic
going to the website. To do this the attacker need to find a point between a
client and the server in which the attacker can insert himself as a man in the
middle. By placing himself as a man in the middle the attacker is able to sniff
the sensitive traffic and can for example steal a session cookie to impersonate
user.
Another often done mistake is that the connection to back end systems is
not encrypted. So if the web application talks to a separate SQL-server it
may be in the clear. If an attacker is able to sniff that traffic the attacker
can manipulate the queries going to and from the database and thereby
performing many types of mischief. In the case of the simplebank the attacker
could steal money from a user of make a transaction go to his account instead
of another valid users account, thereby performing a fraud.
However, since the simplebank website is only being a test scenario. For
this setup there is transport layer security. This is acknowledged as a known
issue but will not be considered when testing the different protection systems.
The reason for not having transport layer security is that the testing will
be further complicated. In some cases it can be very difficult to find out
what is happening when the traffic is protected by an SSL/TLS connection.
Therefore will this kind of vulnerabilities no be considered in the comparison
and will not be considered an attack in the testing either.
5.10 Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards
This vulnerability lets an attacker redirect or forward a user to a malicious
site of the attackers choosing. By doing this the attacker can infect the user
with malware or perform a phishing attack. In terms of business risks this
makes it hard for users to trust the website if they experience a phishing
attack or get infected with malware by visiting a website they consider to be
safe. The simplebank website makes use of both forwards and redirect none
which are validated. The easiest to spot is the login page. The login page
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can take one GET-parameter which tells the server where to redirect the user
to after a successful login. An attacker could manipulate the GET-parameter
and redirect the user to any site he wants. To get the user to click the
URL could be done by sending the user the URL in an email, which looks
legit since it points to the simplebank website but in truth it redirects to
the attackers website which infects the user before it redirects back to the
simplebank website.
To demonstrate this attack on the simplebank website, the following URL
will redirect a user to the website http://evilhacker.com after they have
authenticated with the simplebank website. The attack is carried out in the
experiment by using that URL and perform the correct authentication and
see if the browser is redirected to http://evilhacker.com.
http :// l o c a l h o s t :8080/ simplebank/Login ? next=http :// ev i l h a ck e r . com
Listing 5.5: Unvalidated Forward URL
In the simplebank, the next parameter is meant to redirect the user back to
the site they wanted to visit which needed authentication as shown in listing
5.5. For example, the user gets a direct link to his account overview page,
the user clicks the link but in order to get an account overview the user need
to authenticate first. The simplebank website then stores the link to the
account overview page in the next parameter in the GET-parameter and uses
it without validating that it only redirects to the internal simplebank page
and is not able to redirect to an external page.
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Chapter 6
Results
The chapter presents the results from the experiment. The attacks were all
performed as described in chapter 5 and after each attack the logs for each
defense mechanism was checked to see if it could detect the attack. Results
from the attacks are found in the different sections below, with some discussion
about both the attack and the performance of the defense mechanism.
6.1 Cross Site Scripting
Cross Site Scripting is one quite common attack which many webpages are
vulnerable to. It is also quite easy to detect the common places where such
an attack could happen, however due to web applications often being quite
complex and having many ways of getting input, there are places were it
is really hard to detect a Cross Site Scripting attack. For this experiment
however a simple Cross Site Scripting attack was performed on an input field
in the web application.
Snort Detection
Snort did not detect the Cross Site Scripting attack; even tough Snort comes
with a few rules that should be able to detect it. However even when a
reflected Cross Site Scripting pattern in the URL was tried Snort did not
detect that either.
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ModSecurity Detection
ModSecurity is able to detect the Cross Site Scripting attack with no problems.
It detects the attack both in the incoming request that have the payload,
and in the outgoing requests which actually presents the script to the users
browser so that it is executed. In the log ModSecurity have also logged the
whole request and responses and also the IP-address from where the attack
originated from.
AppSensor Detection
OWASP AppSensor contains a detection point in the application that is able
to detect the incoming Cross Site Scripting attack. However right now the
detection point only scans the incoming input fields in an incoming requests,
and does not detect if a Cross Site Scripting attack could be performed
elsewhere
6.2 SQL-Injection
The SQL-injection performed is also quite simple. It is one of the examples
form wikipedias article on SQL-injection [26]. The SQL-injection is a ’ or
’1’=’1 input string in the password field on the login form. This allows
an attacker to log in as a user with only the username since the password
check always evaluate to true in the password check because of the injected
SQL statement. The reason this simple SQL-injection is used is to make
it easy for the defense mechanisms to detect it. SQL-injections, just like
Cross Site Scripting, can be used everywhere were input is used directly in a
SQL-statement.
Snort Detection
Just as with the Cross Site Scripting attack, there is rules in Snort which
mentions detection of SQL-injections, but it still does not detect this injection.
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ModSecurity Detection
ModSecurity performs much like the case with the Cross Site Scripting attack.
It detects the SQL-injection in the incoming requests and logs the whole
request for further analysis. In addition it is able to check that both the Cross
Site Scripting attack and the SQL.injection attack comes from the same user
and therefore reports them both and gives a more serious combined warning
than the individual warnings it produced for each one individually.
AppSensor
OWASP AppSensor has a detection point in its recommendations [32] which
is to detect for SQL-injections. However the reference implementation of
AppSensor does use a weak SQL-injection detection, which is able to find
SQL-injections such as ”’ SELECT * FROM users;’” but not the simple one
used in the attack. Because of this the AppSensor detection point is not able
to detect the SQL-injection, even tough the detection point is scanning the
string containing the SQL-injection, its rules does not detect it. This is a
weakness in the reference implementation of OWASP AppSensor and not a
weakness in the idea nor the concept of detecting SQL-injections in the input.
6.3 Broken Authentication and Session Man-
agement
Broken Authentication and Session Management can be many things. In this
experiment the attack carried out was to manually create a session cookie.
It allows an attacker to establish a session with the website without going
through the usual authentication mechanisms. Since the session cookies does
not contain any cryptographic nouns it can be created in order to establish a
session with the website. The correct way would be to have a cryptographic
noun and store all the information server-side and only have the cookie use
the noun to identify itself, like the Java EE built in session cookie.
Snort Detection
Snort does not detect that the client has manually added a cookie. The
attacker is able to establish a session without no problems. Also if a cookie is
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tampered with Snort does not detect it.
ModSecurity Detection
ModSecurity does not detect if the client has created a new cookie, nor if an
existing cookie is being tampered with.
AppSensor Detection
AppSensor does detect that the client for session management has manually
added a cookie. It is able to detect if there are other cookies for that domain
which is not used by that application, such as a PHP-session cookie set by
another application will be reported by AppSensor. However the check to
see if an attacker is tampering with the session cookie, the Java EE session
cookie was used. It was used because a reliable way to detect this is needed,
and the login cookie is not reliable since it is trivial to tamper with.
6.4 Insecure Direct Object Reference
Insecure Direct Object Reference can be exploited when web pages have static
content which should be access control restricted, but it is simply served
anonymously to everybody by the web server. The hard thing about these
kinds of exploits is that no technology can know if a resource should be access
restricted or not, since it depends on the context. Therefore there is no way
for a third party device to know which resources should be put under access
control and which should not. Because of this, both ModSecurity and Snort
failed to detect the direct object reference. AppSensor on the other hand,
can be made to detect such errors.
The second direct object reference were the attacker performed a tampering
of the data in the transfer request had the same outcome. ModSecurity and
Snort were unable to detect the attack but AppSensor were able to check the
incoming data and check if it was a violation of the access controls or not.
This is because the account ids only make sense for AppSensor and it is able
to determine which account ids are allowed to be transferred from by the user
performing the transaction and which ones are illegal. For ModSecurity and
Snort all these ids are legal traffic and therefore not detected.
72
AppSensor Detection
Since the AppSensor detection points are built into the application, they can
have the knowledge of the access control mechanisms in the application. An
AppSensor detection points was built in to detect if a user tries to access
the README.txt file on the web server. However one difficulty with using
only AppSensor for detection is that the developers need to know beforehand
which files should be restricted or not, and not make any mistakes, meaning
forget some of them when implementing the access controls and associated
detection points.
The other attack was also detected by AppSensor, since it is able to verify
the results back from the client and check if there have been any tampering
with the request. This is one of the strengths of AppSensor since it is able to
detect access control errors that are specific to the application context.
6.5 Cross Site Request Forgery
This attack is quite common according to OWASP top ten [48], and the way
it was performed on the simplebank was by having a third party website make
the visitor submit a post-request to the simplebank website. This attack is
hard to defend against without doing some modification of the simplebank
website, namely sharing a secret between the website and the users browser.
This is typically done by embedding a cryptographic nonce1 into the forms on
a webpage that is submitted to the client. When the form returns the server
can check to see that the nonce is the same one as it sent out.
Snort Detection
Snort does not embed any cryptographic nonces to the forms which are
outgoing, hence the only way it can detect a cross site request forgery attack
is by looking at the referer header in the HTTP-traffic. But as shown in [42]
this is not a reliable method for detecting cross site request forgery attacks.
Because of this Snort did not find the cross site request forgery attack. Snort
was therefore unable to detect the cross site request forgery attack.
1The NIST SP-800-90 contains a definition for a Nonce [29]
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ModSecurity Detection
ModSecurity with the optional rules enabled is able to detect the cross site
request forgery attack. The optional rules are not enabled by default but
can easily be enabled. These rules inject a cross site request forgery (CRSF)
token or nonce to be precise into every form on the website. Part of the
rule which does this is shown in Figure 6.1.The rule embed javascript code
to the webpage that inserts the nonces into each form. When the form is
submitted back through ModSecurity, it check to see both if the nonce are
included, and if they match with the same nonce that where sent out. This
made ModSecurity detect the cross site request forgery attack and reported
that the nonces were missing from the form submission. One thing to note
here is that this method does not work with asynchronous Javascript and
XML which many modern websites use.
Figure 6.1: ModSecurity Rule with Javascript code it embed
AppSensor Detection
AppSensor currently has no way of detection cross site request forgery at-
tacks. In order for AppSensor to detect it a proper cross site request forgery
protection has to be built into the application which attaches a cryptographic
nonce to each form and requires the POST-request to have that token upon
submission. A detector can then be built in which checks if that nonce is
missing or wrong and therefore detects the cross site scripting attack. This
could have easily been implemented with AppSensor, but since the experiment
focused on using the OWASP detection points, there was no detection point
which would detect potential cross site request forgeries.
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6.6 Failure to Restrict URL Access
Neither Snort nor ModSecurity is able to check if an attacker has bypassed
the authorization or not. This is because they somehow have to have the
knowledge both of how authorization is done in the application, but also which
pages and resources should be protected. AppSensor detects this since it is
inside the application and can know about which pages should be secured or
not. The AppSensor guide has 4 detection points which cover access controls.
By implementing these detection points AppSensor were able to detect if a
user is accessing an URL that is restricted from that user. In the case of the
simplebank, every GET-request which requires authentication is automatically
redirect to the login page, but if a user tries to do a POST-request to the
same page it will be detected and an AppSensor event will be generated.
AppSensor therefore detected the attack.
6.7 Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards
In the simplebank web application this vulnerability is presented in an at-
tribute that can be used to the login method. When a user visits a page that
requires login he is redirected to the login page with a GET-parameter. It
tells which site the user should be taken to after the login process is done.
However since this is a GET-parameter, an attacker can change it to for
example http://evilhacker.com that is a malicious web page. This domain
was used to test the vulnerability in the experiment.
Snort Detection
Snort is unable to detect if an attacker is performing an unvalidated redirect
or forward. This is because Snort would need the knowledge to know what
are legal redirects and forwards and what are malicious.
ModSecurity Detection
ModSecurity is not able to detect the malicious redirect or forward. However
in a recent edition of the Core Rule Set from OWASP that is used with Mod-
Security, there is a feature which checks links against Google Safe Browsing
API [5]. This feature could be used to check not only unvalidated redirects
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and forwards but also all the links on a web site to check if they link to a
known malicious site. Since this is a new feature it was not included in the
experiment, but it could prove useful for these types of attacks. The feature
could also be used to prevent malicious redirects.
AppSensor Detection
AppSensor was able to detect the unvalidated redirects and forwards attack.
AppSensor had one detection point that checked the incoming argument to
the next parameter and had an alert if it was not a subdirectory of the same
domain.
6.8 Testing Other IDS Systems
Because of the bad Snort results, despite the fact that Snort did contain rules,
which should have been able to detect the web application attacks, two other
open source IDS systems were tested. OSSEC was one of them and it is a
open source host-based intrusion detection system (hids) [12] developed by
Trend Micro. Since OSSEC is a host-based ids it contains some functionality
that is not present in Snort, such as rootkit detection, integrated log analysis,
Windows registry checking, file integrity checking and more. In addition to
this it is able to monitor network traffic to that host, and just like Snort,
it contains some rules for traffic analysis. It is therefore able to detect very
simple web application attacks against the host it is protecting. When it was
tested to see if it detected anything at all it was able to detect some simple
cross site scripting patterns in the URL, but not i the body of the HTTP
response.
The other IDS system that were tested was Suricata [11]. It is developed
by the Open Information Security Foundation as the next generation IDS.
Suricata can use the same rules as Snort, and just like Snort, is a network
based IDS. Since Suricata can use the same rules as Snort, it was tested with
both the rules from Snort, but also with the rules from Emerging Threats [3].
The rules from emerging threats were able to detect SQL-injection patterns
when they were done in the URL but not in the body of the HTTP response.
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Table 6.1: Suricata Results
Attack Detected
Cross Site Scripting Not detected
SQL-Injection Partly Detected
Broken Authentication and Session Management Not Detected
Insecure Direct Object Reference Not Detected
C¸ross Site Request Forgery Not Detected
Failure to Restrict URL Access Not Detected
Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards Not Detected
6.8.1 Suricata With Emerging Threat Rules
Since Suricata was able to detect some really simple SQL-injection patterns
in the URL, it was decided to try and perform the attacks with Suricata as
the IDS. The setup of Suricata was inline as a IDS. The version number of
suricata was 1.1.1 from the ubuntu software repository. One thing to notice
here is that Ubuntu version 12.04 was used in place of 11.10. Because Suricata
is only available in 12.04 and an upgrade had been used previously to try a
more recent version of Snort. However despite the operating system upgrade
the software stayed the same, it was still Apache 2.2 and Tomcat 7 with Java
6 that was used. Mostly the standard configuration for Suricata was used but
the IP-addresses was changed to fit the scenario. The rule set from Emerging
Threats was also downloaded and the configuration was changed to use those
rules and used the reference and classifications files from Emerging Threats
ruleset. The full configuration file that was used is in the ZIP-file described
in Appendix A. Both Snort and Modsecurity was turned off while Suricata
was tested.
The results are shown below in a simple table:
The SQL-pattern which Suricata detected is shown in listing 6.1. The %20 is
just a whitespace in the URL. This pattern is harmless against the simplebank
website but it is a known SQL-patterns and therefore matches the rules in
Suricata.
http : / / 3 3 . 3 3 . 3 3 . 1 0 / simplebank/Login ? next=SELECT%20∗%20FROM%20USERS;
Listing 6.1: Simple SQL-injection pattern
These results is almost the same as with Snort. The only difference is that
in the SQL-injection the detection is listed partly. This is because Suricata
was able to detect a very simple SQL-injection pattern in the URL-header.
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Table 6.2: OSSEC results
Attack Detected
Cross Site Scripting Partly Detected
SQL-Injection Partly Detected
Broken Authentication and Session Management Not Detected
Insecure Direct Object Reference Not Detected
C¸ross Site Request Forgery Not Detected
Failure to Restrict URL Access Not Detected
Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards Not Detected
It was however unable to detect the actual attack in the testing or the same
SQL-injection pattern when it was used in the body of the HTML and not
in the URL itself. This is also not the best results but at least Suricata was
able to detect something. Just as with Snort Suricata was also able to detect
a simple portscan with NMAP.
Snort was also tested with the Emerging Threats rules for Snort. The result
was actually identical to Suricata that was better than the detection with the
Snort rules from Sourcefire, the creator of Snort. However this still does not
detect the attacks performed in the experiment since they were delivered in
the body of the HTTP-request and not in the URL.
6.8.2 OSSEC Detection
OSSEC was also tested to see if it was able to detect more of the attacks
which both Snort and Suricata did not detect. The version of OSSEC which
were used was 2.6 which had to be downloaded from the OSSEC website since
there was no native Ubuntu package for it. The default configuration was
used with OSSEC and it was able to detect on the correct ethernet interface
with no changes in the default configuration.
OSSEC unfortunately had the same problems as Suricata, it was not able to
find any attacks in the body of the HTML only in the URL. However OSSEC
used other rules than Suricata and Snort, and was able to detect a simple
cross site scripting in the URL as well as the simple SQL-injection pattern
which Suricata also detected. The results from OSSEC in the scenario are
shown in Table 6.2.
The results are only slightly better than Suricata, and unfortunately all three
IDS systems did not perform very well in detecting web application attacks.
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However Suricata and OSSEC was not tweaked as much as Snort and there
might very well be a way for them to detect the web attacks if they have
a different configuration. There was not enough time to try many different
configurations of them.
6.9 Validity of the Results
For the sake of correctness. The simplebank, the attacks, the built in sensors
and the performance of the experiment was all done by one researcher alone.
Because of this, since the attacks and the AppSensor detection points both
was implemented by the same person, there was bound to be some bias.
The implementer already knew the attacks to detect against! With only one
researcher available it is unavoidable and therefore this should be taken into
consideration when reading these results. This was one of the reasons why
the reference implementation of OWASP AppSensor, and the guidelines were
used as much as possible, to make this bias as small as possible.
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Chapter 7
Discussion
This chapter will discuss the results from the experiment. It highlights both
the general trends that emerged in the results and discuss both the validity
of the results, as well as other thoughts and findings some of which are out of
the scope for this thesis but which is still worth mentioning.
7.1 General Trends from the Experiment
The Table 7.1 sums up the results from the experiment. The yellow cell on
Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards, is yellow because in the newest release
of ModSecurity, there is a feature which can check an URL against Googles
Safe Browsing API[5]. Unfortunately the rules used in the experiment do not
use this feature yet. The other yellow is the SQL-injection which AppSensor
was unable to detect. This is not because AppSensor can not detect a SQL-
injection but because the SQL-injection detection pattern included with the
reference implementation does not match the attack from the experiment. By
replacing the SQL-injection detection pattern this attack can be detected by
AppSensor.
7.1.1 Unsatisfactory Snort Results
Snort did not detect any of the attacks in the experiment. However that
does not make the conclusion that Snort is useless. It only says that in the
way the experiment was set up Snort was unable to detect any of the web
application attacks. However Snort is designed to detect much more than
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Table 7.1: Which Attacks where Detected
Attack Snort ModSecurity AppSensor
Cross Site Script-
ing
Not detected Detected Detected
SQL-Injection Not Detected Detected Partly De-
tected
Broken Au-
thentication
and Session
Managenment
Not Detected Not Detected Detected
Insecure Direct
Object Reference
Not Detected Not Detected Detected
C¸ross Site Re-
quest Forgery
Not Detected Detected Not Detected
Failure to Re-
strict URL Ac-
cess
Not Detected Not Detected Detected
Unvalidated
Redirects and
Forwards
Not Detected Can possibly
be detected
Detected
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just web application attacks. When Snort was configured for the experiment,
a simple portscan was performed which Snort detected and gave alerts to,
none of the other security mechanisms would pick up this threat and Snort
was the only one to detect the portscan.
There is also the possibility that Snort was not configured correctly for
detecting the web application attacks and the rules used was not the latest
subscribed rules which Sourcefire provide, but the rules that comes with the
Ubuntu package of Snort. The setup of Snort could also be malconfigured
for the detection of web application attacks, however as mentioned above
it managed to detect the portscan so at least some part of Snort detection
was working. There is unfortunately not any good explaination for the
unsatisfactory Snort results. Even tough the rules said it should detect
some attacks and Snort was able to detect other attacks, the attacks in the
experiment were not detected. Subsection 7.1.2 highlights the effort to try
and get Snort to detect the attacks, but unfortunately was unsuccessful.
7.1.2 Trying to Get Snort to Detect the Attacks
Snort both has rules and a http inspect preprocessor which should be able to
detect some web attacks. One rule specifically targeted cross site scripting
for example, therefore this attack was specifically tested to get Snort to it
since the current results probably does not do Snort justice.
One of the things which were tested was to upgrade the operating system and
therefore also the Snort version to the latest. During the thesis a new release
of ubuntu, 12.04 came out which contained new packages for Snort, version
2.9.2. After this upgrade the cross site scripting attacks were performed at the
simplebank but Snort did still not detect them. After this the configuration
was changed and many parameters for the http inspect preprocessor were
tried and also some changes to the rules which should have matched the cross
site scripting. Still after many different tweaks of the configuration file Snort
did not detect the cross site scripting attack.
Lastly the newest ruleset and configuration available on the Snort website
where downloaded and tested. But still with this new configuration Snort
was unable to detect the simple cross site scripting attack. This was quite
unfortunate and the error is believed to be because of some unknown error in
the setup of the experiment and not in Snort itself. As mentioned above, the
results for Snort are therefore probably not accurate and many IDPS systems
would probably have performed better in the experiment. But the results
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are the results and while the potential error have been pointed out it still is
there.
7.1.3 Very Satisfying AppSensor Results
AppSensor have some very good results from the experiment. This is mostly
because AppSensor have some advantages by being built into the application
itself. Some of these is highlighted below:
Access Control
Since AppSensor is built into the application itself, it have direct access to
the access controls of the application. Often these can be quite complex.
Let’s consider a simple time registration system. When a user registers his
working hours in the system only he is able to view them, this means that
another coworker should not be able to view his work hours, but his manager
should be able to view them. These kinds of access controls can often be
quite complicated and it is impossible for something outside the application
to understand them.
The biggest challenge with detecting access control attacks is that since
AppSensor is built into the access control system and there is a bug in the
access control system that grants a user illegal access to a resource, it is
unlikely that a detection point can actually detect that particular bug. If the
bug was known it probably would have been fixed in the code anyway. One
advantage however is that AppSensor might be able to detect and block an
attacker before the attacker discovers the bug.
Application Logic
Since AppSensor is built into the application, it can check for exploits that
use the applications logic to make an exploit. These types of attacks come
in many varieties and it is impossible to make it a general attack, it has
to be specific for the application that is attacked. Since AppSensor is built
into the application itself it is able to detect for example the access control
violation of the direct object reference attack 5.4. This is because AppSensor
can understand the context of the web application and detect these specific
attacks. This is biggest difference between AppSensor and the other defense
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mechanisms and much of the reason why AppSensor can detect attacks no
other defense mechanisms can.
Validating Input
Since AppSensor is built into the application, it known exactly which character
encoding the application is using and can perform data normalization in the
correct character encoding. Any outside mechanisms can potentially use
the wrong encoding and while it tries to sanitize the inputs for the web
application, it might do so with a wrong encoding, making it possible to
bypass the sanitation filter.
Another issue is that some pages often want to accept dangerous input to be
able to write it in text, for example this thesis have SQL-injections inside it,
but they are just text, nothing more. One problem with an external filter
like a WAF is that it might be impossible without explicitly whitelist the
input in order to be able to receive the dangerous input. The application
would then properly escape the input itself. By being inside the application
AppSensor can easily know which places this short of input should never occur
and where it should. For example a blogpost should be able to write about
SQL-injections, but a login field should probably not contain SQL-injection
input.
More Granular Blocking
Since OWASP AppSensor is built into the application, it is able to do much
more granular blocking of malicious activity. It can for example, just suspend
a user account if a user is misbehaving while logged in, it could disable some
part of the application if it is being exploited, or it could completely block
both the user and his IP-address from the network. This kind of granular
blocking makes AppSensor able to respond more appropriately to the threat.
Not every threat is really serious and often it could be a curious technical
guy just checking to see if there are any easy exploits on the site.
The OWASP AppSensor crosstalk [57] contains a list of many ways to block
an attacker. These are given in Table 7.2.
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Table 7.2: Response Actions
Response Type Example
Logging Change Log the incident, record the user performing
it
Administrator Notification Make an notification on the administrator
console
Other Notification Send a signal to the upstream firewall, IDPS
or WAF
Proxy Makes further requests go into a proxy system
(honeypot)
User Status Change Change data validation strictness of this user
User Notification Send the user an email telling him he is being
monitored
Timing Change Deliberately slow down users requests
Process Terminated Discard data and force user to start business
process from start
Function Amended Limit on feature usage rate imposed
Function Disabled Part of the application is disabled
Account Logout Session is terminated
Account Lockout Account is locked until administrator resets
it
Application Disabled Application taken oﬄine, temporary static
page shows
Collect Data from User Deploy a Java applet to collect remote IP
address
The key point with these response mechanisms is that it is really up to the
implementer of AppSensor to specify them and does not have to be restricted
by the reference implementation done by OWASP. By restriction, it means
that if their website is written in another language, they could implement
the AppSensor framework themselves in that language. The implementer
also could tune their AppSensor response mechanisms to be custom to their
website. For example a webshop could have a malicious user not being able
to checkout, if AppSensor has reported them for doing malicious activity.
Therefore a full list of which detection points AppSensor would have been
never ending.
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7.1.4 Drawbacks with OWASP AppSensor
Even tough OWASP AppSensor did get very good detection results in the
experiment; there are several drawbacks with this kind of approach.
Implementation Specific
Detection points that are built into the application is depending on the
implementation itself. This means that they are only as good as they are
implemented and are only able to detect the things they are specifically meant
to detect. What this means is that if the implementers have a vulnerability
they do not know about, they cannot implement a detection point for it either.
Since a WAF and a IDPS system often comes with a set of rules which can
detect common attacks, it makes sense to use both a WAF/IDPS and at
the same time build in AppSensor in the application. That way there is a
possibility that if there are some vulnerabilities, which there are no detection
points for, it might be caught by the IDPS/WAF.
Another concern here is the possibility for bugs and implementation errors
in the implementation of AppSensor. There is always the possibility that an
implementation error can make the detection either not working at all or give
a false positives or false negatives. The same argument can be said for both
an IDPS and a WAF, because they could also have bugs and errors making
the detection fail. This is discussed further in Section 8.4.4.
AppSensor Lacks Anomaly Detection
AppSensor, in its reference implementation at least, lacks the anomaly detec-
tion that many IDPS and WAFs pride themselves in. Anomaly detection in
an IDPS and WAF first learns the normal behavior of an application and then
tries to detect when something out of the ordinary happens. The big argument
for performing this is that attacks which are currently unknown might be
detected, while signature based detection only can detect previously known
attacks. While this might be true, the biggest drawback with anomaly-based
detection is to actually detect attacks reliably and at the same time have a
low false positive and false negative rates. While AppSensor does not have
anomaly detection the same way an IDPS or WAF does, it can perform some
of the same functionalities. For example the detection points of user trend
and system trend from the OWASP AppSensor document [32] does indeed
look for suspicious behavior in the application usage. Just as with anomaly
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detection these can have false positives. For example with the system trend
detection point, which detects if a large number of logins have happened
in the last hour. This could happen if the website suddenly became very
popular and generated a huge amount of legal traffic. The detection point
would probably report false positives.
One advantage of the AppSensor anomaly detection is that like detection
points they are often tuned for the specific application since they are built in.
This means that the time needed to tune to the system is probably far less
than a traditional IDPS of WAF would need. The need to tune the anomaly
detection, or trending as OWASP calls them however is quite important, as
shown above a false positive could easily occur with the AppSensor trend
monitoring.
7.2 Response Mechanisms and Blocking
The different defense mechanisms have different ways of blocking attacks,
each with their advantages and disadvantages. While this was not tested in
the experiment, a short discussion is provided here to give the whole picture
of the comparison because the detection is only part of the functionality of
the different defense mechanisms.
7.2.1 Snort Blocking
There are several ways an IDPS system can perform blocking, the two main
ways are listed on Sans intrusion detection FAQ [20]. The first method, which
is session disruption is able to disrupt the connection used by an attacker to
carry out the attack. It can send a TCP-reset package to end TCP connections
or use ICMP-protocol to disrupt an attack carried out over UDP. As the FAQ
points out, a sophisticated attacker with knowledge of TCP could circumvent
his way around the session disruption. The other method, which is complete
blockage of the IP-address should be used with care as the FAQ suggests. .
This is because an attacker could use the blocking features to his advantage
by having the IDPS system block valid traffic, which in practice makes a
denial of service attack.
These two types of blocking are certainly useful, but in a web application
context they mostly work at a lower level than the web application itself.
However an attack carried against a web application is usually performed
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Table 7.3: ModSecurity Actions
Disruptive Actions Causes ModSecurity to do something.
Often means blocking, but not always
Non-disruptive actions Do something, but that something does
not and cannot affect the rule processing
flow.
Flow actions These actions affect the rule flow.
Meta-data actions Meta-data actions are used to provide
more information about rules.
Data actions Not really actions, these are mere con-
tainers that hold data used by other
actions.
over HTTP, which is transmitted over TCP. So the response with either TCP
session disruption or complete blocking would prevent the web application
attack. However as mentioned above this could also be user by an attacker
to perform a denial of service attack.
The Snort manual [49] also lists a third option, which is mainly a variant
of the session disruption action. This action is called React and it sends a
HTML-page on a session and then resets it. The HTML-page can be custom
and control of the HTTP-headers is also allowed, so a custom HTTP response
code can be used.
7.2.2 ModSecurity Blocking
ModSecurity have several actions it can take according to the ModSecurity
manual [56]. These actions have been divided into five categories.
The different actions that ModSecurity can perform are many, but since
they are divided into different groups it is easier to get a grasp of them.
The disruptive actions are actions, which deny or block. One example of a
disruptive action is to send the request to a proxy or send a redirect to a page
informing that such attacks is not tolerated. The disruptive actions is similar
to the session disruption and blocking which Snort can do, but it also have
some additional options such as the proxy action which Snort does not have.
The non-disruptive actions have some interesting features, such as sanitizing
the request before handling it to the web application. This means that if
an attack is launched ModSecurity can thwart it, but it does not disrupt or
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block the connection. This makes it impossible for an attacker to misuse the
feature for denial of service attacks as can be done with the blocking options.
There are many other options here, such as settings a environmental variable
for Apache or pause the connection for a certain period of time.
The last three categories of actions is mostly about how ModSecurity parses
and handles the rules it matches against. These actions can be used to
manipulate or do other actions with the data that is being processed by
ModSecurity. Examples of these involves, setting the severity rating of the
rule, skip rules on successful match or log some extra information when this
rule is matched. These actions are not detailed here since they are mostly
relevant for the internal detection which ModSecurity performs.
7.2.3 AppSensor Response Mechanisms
The subsection 7.1.3 contains most of the details regarding AppSensor response
mechanisms. The main point is that it is possible to write custom actions that
are part of the application and can manipulate the application behavior in case
of an attack. AppSensor can also take many of the ideas that ModSecurity
and Snort uses and apply them. However it could be difficult for AppSensor
to utilize the low-level session disruption that Snort and ModSecurity uses
since the application generally does not have this low level access to the
webserver.
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Chapter 8
Comparison
This chapter will compare a IDPS, a WAF and an AppSensor based application.
First a general overview of the technologies and their strengths will be given
and afterward a list of attacks and how these different technologies can
protect against it, if they can. The comparison will focus on web application
vulnerabilities, meaning that other types like email, LDAP and other services
will not be considered. The comparison starts with a discussion of general
IDPS and WAF systems and thereafter discusses the concrete products used
in this thesis, snort and ModSecurity.
Both other literature and the experiment will be used as a basis for the
comparison of the different products.
8.1 IDPS Overview
An IDPS is mostly defending at the network layer in the infrastructure and
not so much on the application layer. This makes the IDPS a very useful
addition to any network, but in this comparison it will fall short since it
is not meant to be purely about web application vulnerabilities. The main
advantage of the IDPS is that it is able to understand low-level traffic and
protocols [50]. The other detection points higher up in the ISO OSI models
layers won’t be able to detect for example a syn-flood attack, because it
operates on a level too low for a WAF or the application itself to detect.
This low-level detection might be attacks that can have an effect on a web
application, because for example an attack on the DNS-server would render
the web application useless since no one can get to it by DNS name. Another
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example is a simple syn-flood attack or a sockstress attack[22] which would
make a denial of service attack and also prevent users from accessing the web
application.
In a network topology the IDPS sensors is used to protect almost every aspect
of the network and not just the web application. This means that an IDPS
might protect both the email-server, the web-server as well as users desktops
or laptops. Since it operates at this low-level it means is spans many more
services which relies on the low-level services, such as TCP which is used by
both the web application and by the email SMTP server, while an IDPS would
not necessarily understand the SMTP or HTTP protocols. IDPS systems
also comes in many different flavors, from the ones that monitors the big
incoming connections to a corporate network to a small IDPS system running
on every host computer. Since they come in so many different flavors, they
can be used many places in the infrastructure as detailed in Section 2.1.
Since an IDPS can also understand up to layer 7 traffic, it is completely
possible that an IDPS can do much of the work a WAF can do in addition
to all the low-level protocols it is able to handle. For a business, if an
IDPS system is able to detect many common web application exploits, like for
example injection attacks by analyzing the HTTP-portion of a network packet.
It can in many ways replace a WAF. A WAF may also perform analysis of the
cookies and state of the HTTP-traffic. However there is nothing preventing
an IDPS system from being able to also understand the states and session
created using cookies if it is sophisticated enough. All this means the lines
between an IDPS and a WAF can often be quite blurry and hard to make a
real distinguishing between them.
8.2 WAF Overview
A WAF is only able to protect a web application. It usually sit in between the
traffic flow to the web application or even on the same server and monitors
and blocks attacks on the web application. A WAF unlike a IDPS does only
understand the HTTP(S) protocols and perhaps other related protocols such
as Javascript, SQL, XML, cookies etc. It is specialized in detection at this
level. This mean that it can easily detect known attacks such as XSS or SQL-
injections since they are easy to recognize. The biggest difference between a
WAF and an IDPS is that the WAF only understands the HTTP(S) layers,
while the IDPS understand and detects attacks in the lower level protocols
too. This oftem makes the WAF perform more accurate in detecting web
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application attacks compared to a IDPS. However since both understand
HTTP they can largely overlap. By having both an IDPS and a WAF that
overlaps can be an advantage, this means that if one of them has an error
there is a chance that the other one catches it.
In addition to filter and scan the traffic that goes to a web application, a
WAF can be configured to have some intelligence about the web application
itself. Such as restriction for certain web pages by IP-address or other types
of restrictions. For example it can prevent the usage of other HTTP methods
than GET for a specific page.
A WAF can produce something called a virtual patch, meaning that if a
vulnerability if found in a web application, instead of patching the application
itself a patch can be written as a virtual patch for the WAF. That way an
exploit against the vulnerability is blocked by the WAF until a proper patch
in the application itself can be issued. The advantage is that the vulnerability
is blocked early, the disadvantage is that if the virtual patch need to be
carefully written so it does not malfunction or creates false positives.
The main thing that a WAF can not protect against is application specific
vulnerabilities, such as an attacker bypassing the authorization by accessing a
resource directly with URL guessing. A WAF can detect generic attacks such
as XSS and SQL-injections that have the same characteristics across different
web applications. This does not make a WAF not useful, quite the contrary.
Many attacks today are generic attacks that works on many different web
applications, at least for finding the vulnerability. To craft a SQL-injection
to actually do harm requires some manual work to tailor the SQL-query to
the specific web application, but the detection can still be done in a generic
manner.
8.2.1 Anomaly Detection
One way both an IDPS and a WAF uses to overcome the limitation rule-
based detection is with anomaly detection. Anomaly detection is covered in
Subsection 2.2.2, but it let an IDPS and a WAF detect previously unknown
threats. The big benefit with anomaly detection is that it can learn and
be tuned to the normal traffic of an application and then be able to detect
anomalies, which often can be attacks. The weakness is that anomaly detection
has a high degree of both false positives and false negatives. The counter
argument AppSensor makes is that since it understands the application better,
since it is tailored to it, it can do just as good a job with detecting these
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attacks but with a lower false positive rate.
8.2.2 A Note About Stateful Packet Inspection
Stateful Packet Inspection is a feature many IDPS systems boast. It it
essentially that the IDPS inspects the whole packet, meaning the contents of
the packet and not just the headers. This often makes an IDPS able to detect
many of the same vulnerabilities inside packets the same way a WAF does.
Even tough a WAF tends to be better at understanding web traffic, meaning
cookies, Javascript and so on, there is nothing preventing an IDPS system
from implementing the same features. Because of this it is often difficult to
draw a hard line between a WAF and an IDPS system. There are however a
few keypoints which most of the time make then different.
• WAF is often able to decrypt and inspect HTTPS traffic
• WAF is often better at learning the web application traffic (if a positive
security model is used)
However all these points can be proven wrong, there are no rules that say
that a IDPS should never be able to decrypt HTTPS traffic, nor that it could
not learn the behavior of a web application just as well as a WAF. Because of
these points there is often hard to draw a line between an IDPS and a WAF.
8.3 AppSensor Overview
AppSensor is able to detect many generic attacks such as SQL-injection and
XSS just as a WAF is able to, but since it is built into the application itself,
it is also able to block business logic attacks and similar context sensitive
attacks. If we look at the example from the WAF where an attacker accesses a
resource directly. In an AppSensor powered application it can detect that an
unauthorized user is trying to access the resource and if the user tries many
other resources by URL-guessing, it might block the users IP-address from
the application entirely. The big weakness is that since AppSensor has to be
built in, the developers building the application needs to think about and
handle such incidents or else the application will be vulnerable. This happens
despite the presence of AppSensor detectors other places in the application.
This makes AppSensor potentially as good as a WAF for detecting general
threats against a web application, however since it has to be implemented
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for every new application there is a higher risk that there could either be
a mistake in the implementation or some spot of the application which the
application developers have forgotten.
The biggest drawback and advantage with using AppSensor is that it has to be
built into the application itself and can not be a drop in solution like a WAF or
an IDPS. This means that while potentially AppSensor can detect and prevent
all attacks on a web application, it is not practical to make that assumption.
Since AppSensor is built into the application and can only detect what the
developers make it detect, it suffers the same consequences as a regular web
application, meaning that if the web application have a vulnerability, the
chances are high that there is no detection point which can detect and prevent
the vulnerability from being exploited. With this argument one can assume
that an application with AppSensor is probably not more secure than an
application without AppSensor. However, AppSensor lets the application
detect even potential attacks. So if the application is attacked with for
example a simple SQL-injection, which fails because the application properly
sanitize it’s input, with AppSensor the attack still gets detected. If the same
attacker then proceeds to try other simple attacks which the application also
blocks but still detected AppSensor is able to identify the attacker and take
preventative measures. AppSensor can then take appropriate action against
that user to prevent the user form trying further exploits. This means that
while the application might have a vulnerability that it can not detect, it can
still thwart the attacker before he finds it.
Since AppSensor is built into the application, it is also closer to the data
it want to protect. This can be a benefit since it knows how the data is
handled inside the application and can therefore be built with that in mind.
For example, in the simplebank application, AppSensor can detect if a large
transaction is taking place and thereby alerting the administrators of the
simplebank that something is happening. Another benefit by being closer
to the data is that it can prevent an attacker from circumventing the entire
security layer. If the network setup would allow an attacker, which had gained
access to the network were the application was running. The attacker could
make requests directly to the web application server and thereby circumventing
the entire WAF which would normally be placed in front. The attacker is not
able to circumvent AppSensor since it is part of the application itself. The
only way would be to gain direct database access and read and manipulate
the data stored there. Thus by being closer to the data it is trying to protect,
AppSensor have some benefit compared to the other tools. However, this
assumption can be wrong since there are Host-based IDPS systems and a
WAF can very well be running on the same host as the web application server.
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8.4 Recommended Use of the Security Mech-
anisms
Some recommendations for using different security mechanisms in web appli-
cations will be given in this section. The recommendations will be given for
both an existing project as well as for new projects. The projects, which are
discussed is assumed to be web application projects as this is the focus of the
thesis.
8.4.1 Defense in Depth
Defense in depth is a principle in security that means that security should be
implemented in depth. Looking at the information centric defense in depth
from [43]. The web application with its data would be the entity that need
most protection. This is illustrated in Figure 8.1 which contains the data
in the middle, then the application, the WAF and the IDPS on the outside.
This figure could have been larger with many more layers, but this will suffice
for the point illustrated here.
The idea with having these defense mechanisms in layers is that if the outer
layer can not catch an attack, there is still another layer which might catch the
attack. Even tough these layers can be redundant there is still the possibility
of errors in each of the layers and there are also many ways an attacker can
get around some of these defenses. For example an attacker can use a special
encoding to trick the IDPS to not catch the attack, but the same special
encoding might not work on the WAF which is behind.
Figure 8.1: Defense in Depth Illustrated
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8.4.2 Why Not Take All of Them
If the project can afford to have all three of the security mechanisms, then
off course, all three should be applied. One of the benefits to having all
three is that they excel at different levels of detection as shown in Figure
8.2. However having all three can lead to high costs in terms of initial setup
and configurations, as well as a higher chance of false positives since there
are now three sources that can get a false positive alert and not one or two.
There are also higher costs for doing the initial setup and later on tune and
maintain all three. If the application changes both the IDPS, the WAF and
AppSensor would need to be configured for that change and as usual the cost
is higher when the number of devices are higher.
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Figure 8.2: Showing the main differences between IDPS, WAF and AppSensor
In addition to these costs, the possibility that all these mechanisms can
provide unexpected side effects is also a possibility. This can happen when
for example the WAF sanitizes the input when the application needs to have
input which are considered harmful. For example in order to post about cross
site scripting on a forum, the forum need to accept cross site scripting in
its input and properly escape them by itself. If a WAF sanitizes the input
it could be double encoded resulting in the original characters being lost in
the process. This might make the AppSensor detection not accurate enough,
since many attacks would be blocked before they reach AppSensor. This
might make it hard for AppSensor to give a proper analysis of the attacks it
detects and the severity of them. For example, if an attacker first tries many
simple SQL-injections, which all are blocked by a WAF. AppSensor therefore
does not take any actions against the user, so when the user finally finds a
vulnerability, it might be too late because from AppSensors view this is just
one attack attempt and will not trigger the proper response.
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8.4.3 IDPS or WAF
If a project wants to have only one external defense mechanism in front of
the web application, what should it choose? An IDPS or a WAF? From the
results of the experiment, ModSecurity outperformed Snort when it came to
web application defense. However one should consider that the experiment
was only done with one type of IDPS and one type of WAF. If other IDPS
and WAFs had been tested the results might have been different. Another
consideration is that the test only considered web application exploits. So
the choice between either a WAF or IDPS will come down to if it is only web
application protection that is needed or if a whole network needs protection
and the web application is only part of that network. In the latter case then
an IDPS system would be preferably, since it can protect against a wide range
of attacks not only web application based attacks. If there is only the need
for web application security, then a WAF would be the best choice.
8.4.4 AppSensor or WAF
One difficult decision is to choose between a WAF and AppSensor as a means
to identify attacks and protect a web application. This is not to say that
the application should not be written without security in mind, but it is not
always enough and mistakes are made. Because of this it is often valuable
information to know if somebody is trying to attack the application or not.
If a project has to make a decision between a WAF or implement AppSensor
there are some though choices that needs to be made. As with everything
the answer depend but some considerations are listed below.
• Is the goal to protect an existing web application or is the application
being developed from scratch?
• Is the project able to use the reference implementation of AppSensor or
does it need to implement a framework from scratch themselves?
• Are there many frameworks or other network equipment that make the
detection difficult?
• Does the architecture support many of the recommended response
mechanisms?
• Is there a significant enough security requirements to invest in building
in AppSensor?
• The need to change the application in the future
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• Is there much security knowledge on the development team
The questions asked above are all important to consider if a project is trying
to consider between a WAF and AppSensor. It is also wise to consider that
AppSensor, since it is built in, often have a lower false positive rate than
a WAF and that the WAF would need to be configured and tuned for the
application it is protecting. So while AppSensor might take development
time, a WAF also takes time to deploy, tune and get it to work correctly, it
is not something that can easily just be added. This needs to be taken into
consideration if a project is choosing between a WAF or AppSensor.
If these points are taken into consideration there is according to the experiment
and the theoretical comparison a benefit to choosing AppSensor over a WAF.
In the experiment AppSensor was able to detect more attacks than the WAF.
AppSensor is also able to perform a much more granular responses to attack
than what a WAF is able to do. So while a WAF might be good protection,
according to both the experiment and the literature AppSensor would perform
better. However having both would not be a bad thing according to the
defense in depth principle, but as mentioned above one need to be careful
since many of these technologies can manipulate the traffic and hence making
it harder for the other to detect attacks.
If the application is of such a nature that it will often be changed, AppSensor
might have an advantage. Since AppSensor is built into the application, it
is easier to also update the detection points and response mechanisms when
changing the application. This change is also something that AppSensor
might get for free, since it uses the application itself. For example, if the
application have a whitelist of characters it accepts and there is a detection
point which detects every time something is not on the whitelist. If the
whitelist changes, AppSensor will automatically use the new changed version.
If a WAF was doing the same sanitation against the whitelist, the WAFs copy
of the whitelist also needs to be updated. Since the WAF is further away
from the application change, it is easy to forget to update the WAF.
One big advantage that a WAF has, is that since it comes with built in rules,
it comes with great security knowledge. If the developers developing a web
application have little knowledge about security, this might be a huge benefit
since the WAF implicitly contains expert security knowledge. AppSensor
on the other hand only has its manual from OWASP, which contains some
expert knowledge. While this is certainly useful, it still requires much more
knowledge about security from the developers than a WAF would require.
On the other hand, a WAF needs tuning to the application and should
probably not be seen as a appliance which can be deployed without any
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Table 8.1: Comparison of Strengths and Weaknesses
Strengths Weaknesses
IDPS • Low-level protocols
• Protects more than web
application
• Can perform blocking
• Can detect anomalies
• Limited understanding
of HTTP(S)
• No understanding of ap-
plication logic
• Furthest away from the
application data
WAF • Understands HTTP(S)
• Can detect anomalies
• Can perform blocking
• Only protects Web ap-
plication
• No understanding of ap-
plication logic
• Away from the applica-
tion data
AppSensor • Understands HTTP(S)
• Understands applica-
tion logic
• Can perform some
blocking
• Close to the application
data
• Only protects Web ap-
plication
• Have to be customized
for every application
security knowledge.
8.5 Comparison Summary
Below are some of the main points from the comparison collected in Table
8.1. This table provides an easy overview for the different strengths and
weaknesses of the three security tools and summarizes the comparison of
the products. The different tools each have their strengths and weaknesses
and the comparison have tried to highlight the differences as well as the
commonalities.
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Chapter 9
Conclusion
The conclusion repeats the answers to all the research questions and summa-
rizes the results from the experiment. In addition it will discuss some topics
for further research.
9.1 Research Questions
The research questions were developed to help answering the overall goal of the
thesis, which was to compare the detection part of different web application
security products. These products were divided into three categories, namely,
an IDPS system, a WAF and at last OWASP AppSensor. The research
questions which were developed where the following:
• RQ1: What is the current state of application-based intrusion detection
and prevention systems?
• RQ2: How does OWASP AppSensor compare to other IDPS technolo-
gies?
• RQ3: In the given scenario, what are the benefits of using AppSensors
compared with trying to stop the attacks in a IDPS or web-application
firewall?
• RQ4: How hard is it to built AppSensor into an application?
The first and second research questions are answered by doing a simple
literature review of the latest research on web application intrusion detection
and prevention, spanning from both IDPS systems, to OWASP AppSensor
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with many other mentions also. The second question is partly answered with
this literature study and partly answered with the experiment performed.
The third and fourth research questions are answered with the experiment.
The experiment is to make a scenario of a bank, which only has a website which
its customers interact with. Then a set of attacks where developed which
could exploit the bank and three different security mechanisms where each
fitted one of the three categories were placed in front of the web application
and the experiment observed which kind of security mechanisms were able to
block what.
9.1.1 Research Question 1
Chapter 2 goes into depth of what the current state of attack detection
systems are. In essence there were three big types of attack detection systems
for web applications. The first one is intrusion detection and prevention
systems. These systems are more broad than the others, because it does not
only protect the web application, but also protects the operating system and
other applications. IDPS systems come in many different sizes and types, but
the two main types for this thesis is network-based and host-based. For this
thesis, the main difference between them is their placement in the network.
In the thesis, both of these are in front of the web application and inspect all
the traffic that goes to the web application.
The second type of security mechanisms was the Web Application Firewall
(WAF). The WAF is similar to an IDPS system in that it inspects the traffic
that comes into a web application. The main difference is that a WAF is only
focused on HTTP-traffic and other web application related traffic. This means
that often a WAF is better than an IDPS system at detecting web application
attacks. Often these types of systems can be configured in a positive security
model, meaning that they only allow traffic that seems secure into the web
application. Since a WAF is only interested in the web application traffic, it
is generally argued that a WAF is better at creating a realistic model of what
is legal and allowed traffic to a web application.
The last type of web application security mechanisms which where found, are
OWASP AppSensor. OWASP AppSensor is a project, which takes the idea
of custom-built sensors or detection points in a web application to be used to
detect attack on the web application. This is a pretty new approach because
it lies in the application itself and also that it is not a simple general drop-in
solution that can be placed in front of any application like an IDPS or a WAF
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can be. It is these properties that make AppSensor interesting to compare
with the other solutions, both because it requires a significant higher cost for
a project to implement, but it can detect attacks which are almost impossible
for the other solutions to detect, at least without custom rules.
The first research question therefore found the three biggest alternatives in
the field of application-based intrusion detection and prevention systems:
• IDPS
• WAF
• OWASP AppSensor
9.1.2 Research Question 2
The second research question is answered by part literature review and part
from the experiment. Since the literature had few concrete comparisons of the
different products that was published openly and available to the public, the
experiment was developed to see if the claims from OWASP was actually true.
The other part of the experiment was to see how difficult it is to implement
AppSensor into a simple application and how much work is required in order
to use AppSensor.
To answer the second research question, the literature most of the time where
consistent with the results from the experiment. One exception was that Snort
was unable to detect any of the web application attacks, however as discussed
earlier this might be a configuration error or some other errors in the setup.
The biggest weakness of the experiment is that some concrete IDPS and WAF
had to be chosen to perform the experiment and the results could be quite
different if any other IDPS or WAF is being used. However based on the
experiment it seems that a WAF is well suited to defend against well known
web application attacks, which can be easy to detect across applications
because they use the same technique. AppSensor shines in that in addition
to detect the well known web application attacks it is also able to detect
attack which exploits the internal workings of an application, such as failure
in access controls mechanisms.
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9.1.3 Research Question 3
Research question 3 is quite interesting because there are both benefits
and drawbacks to detect and respond to attacks by using AppSensor. This
question is answered in the discussion chapter 7. The main benefit with using
AppSensor to detect attacks is that it is inside the application and close to the
data. Because of this it is able to understand the applications logic, business
logic, authorization logic and other parts of the application. When reacting
to attacks AppSensor is able to have the application itself respond to the
attacks by blocking a user, logging him out or disable the entire application.
These granular response mechanisms is much more powerful and more flexible
than the more simple block or interrupt which an IDPS or a WAF is able to
do. However in the testing it was discovered that the WAF is also able to
disable the application or reroute the traffic to a honeypot system. However
it is still not as flexible as AppSensor.
One drawback with AppSensor is that since it is so close to the application, it
is the last layer of defense. Defense in depth principle says that the defenses
should be put i layers around the application such that if one layer either can
not detect an attack, the next layer may be able to detect the attack. The
other drawback with AppSensor is that it must be built into an application,
this might not be a problem if an application is written from scratch but for
an existing application it would be more difficult, especially if the application
have no way of supporting the response mechanisms such as a forced logout,
account lockdown or disable part of the application.
9.1.4 Research Question 4
The last question is a hard one to give a concrete answer to and the answer
from the little experiment is that, it depends. However if the implementation
is broken into four different scenarios it might be easier to give an answer.
• New project using the reference implementation
• Existing web application using the reference implementation
• New project making its own implementation
• Existing web application making its own implementation
The first type is the easiest to make use of AppSensor, since the web ap-
plication being developed can be developed with AppSensor in mind and
since the business logic must be written from scratch it is easy to include
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detection points. The response mechanisms can also easily be tuned to the
application and opposite. So a new application being built might include ways
of dynamically disable features or take the application oﬄine and other such
response mechanisms that might be hard to add to an existing application.
In the experiment there was not many difficulties with implementing the
detection points, however since the response mechanisms where omitted from
the implementation it is hard to say how difficult it would be to implement
those.
The next type is an existing application wanting to build in AppSensor by
using the reference implementation. Since the reference implementation is in
Java, it is assumed that the existing application is also written in Java. While
some of the detection points could be implemented outside the application,
with for example filters in Java EE. Some of the detection points are directly
attached to the business logic and these would be more difficult to implement.
The most difficult part would be the response mechanisms to implement.
However since it is really up to the implementer to decide which response
mechanisms should be implemented, these could be chosen carefully with
regards to existing functionality and architecture of the application.
To make a new implementation of AppSensor for a new application would
not be too hard. When doing this the AppSensor implementation could be
customized to exactly that application and could be implemented in whatever
fashion wanted. However while some work would have been duplicate of
the reference implementation there are many reasons to make their own
implementation. One could be that the application is being written in
another language, another could be that the reference implementation does
not meet certain requirements, such as test-coverage, performance or other
requirements.
The last type is to custom build AppSensor for an existing application. How
hard this is is very depended on the existing application, but since AppSensor
is being built from scratch it could take advantage of the architecture and
design of the application. For example if the application supports filters
which can filter traffic before reaching the application, many detection points
could be implemented this way just as with the reference implementation.
However the existing application could also be a huge challenge and make
the implementation very hard, but it is really dependent on the existing
application.
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9.2 Further Work
Since AppSensor and application based intrusion detection seems to be a new
idea and not such a mature field yet, there is still much work to be done.
9.2.1 Larger Experiment
One type of further work could be to perform a larger experiment, with
more attacks and another bigger web application. This would really help to
compare AppSensor to other intrusion detection technologies and perhaps
reveal some new findings. Another benefit be performing a bigger experiment
is that a more fair comparison would have been given,
9.2.2 Study of AppSensor in Practice
A study of how AppSensor was used in the industry and also some numbers and
experiences from the different places AppSensor are used and how effective
it is. With such a study questions such as, how hard it is to implement
AppSensor, would be answered more correctly. Other questions that can be
answered is how common it is to integrate AppSensor with other applications,
such as a SIEM system or a WAF. It would also answer how many actually
use the reference implementation and if it is common to implement their own
implementation of AppSensor.
9.2.3 More Comprehensive IDPS Experiment
An experiment that covered IDPS-systems more comprehensively and tried
to get for example Snort or Suricata to detect attacks which are inside the
HTTP-requests and not just in the URL. The reason to why for example Snort
was unable to detect the different attacks when even tough it reported that is
processed even POST-requests is currently unknown. A new experiment which
focused on either getting these IDPS systems to work with web application
attacks, or compared other commercial products would be beneficial and
perhaps get better results for IDPS systems with regards to web application
security.
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9.2.4 Another Reference Implementation
One topic for further research would have been to create another reference
implementation, or extend the current one with more detection points and
perhaps with some built in ways for interacting with other systems. Other
benefits with having another reference implementation are that the concept of
application-based intrusion detection could be further explored and another
implementation could help both implementations become better.
9.2.5 Testing AppSensor on a Production System
One of the last and perhaps hardest pieces of further work is to implement
and test the AppSensor concept on a real website. By having AppSensor
on a real website, it would be able to find and tune the different thresholds
for AppSensor. The false positive rate and false negative rates could also be
measured and guidelines for what the different thresholds should be, could be
collected.
Other benefits would be to see if how effective the different response mecha-
nisms would be against real world attackers. For example the account lockout
could easily be worked around by an attacker. It might also scare the attacker
away from trying to attack the website anymore or it might encourage the
attacker into trying harder and get around the AppSensor protection system.
These questions and many more could be answered by testing AppSensor on
a real production system.
9.2.6 Make AppSensor and a WAF Cooperate
In chapter 8 the point was made that with more than one security appliance
sanitizing the input or blocking the attack, knowledge of the attack was lost
for the next layer of defense. One idea for further work would be to look at
the possibility of getting for example AppSensor and a WAF to cooperate.
This would solve the problem of information being lost when several defense
systems are used. One way to do this is to have AppSensor read the logs of
the WAF and track all the incidents it reports. This would need to be true
the other way around and AppSensor could be able to trigger an event in the
WAF. A research project like this would be very interesting and useful, since
it will increase the security according to the defense in depth but at the same
time get accurate detection in all the systems.
106
9.2.7 Test Anomaly Detection Against AppSensor
In this experiment, only the rule-based detection of both the IDPS and the
WAF was tested. An experiment, which looked at how anomaly detection
in both an IDPS and a WAF would compare against AppSensor, would be
very interesting. However this would be very hard to perform since anomaly
detection needs both tuning and learning time, which are many sources for
uncertainty. But the claims from OWASP AppSensor team that AppSensor
is able to detect attacks with a lower false positive rate compared to an IDPS
or a WAF would be interesting to test.
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Appendix A
Zip-file Contents
There is a zip-file with the thesis which contains the sourcecode, the config-
uration files and the rules used in the thesis. These are all included so the
results are easy to reproduce and possible errors can be found.
Simplebank
The sourcecode is in the simplebank folder. The simplebank application
is using Maven to handle the dependencies. In order to run the simplebank
application with Jetty, the following command in listing A.1 will run the
simplebank application with the embedded jetty application server.
mvn j e t t y : run
Listing A.1: Run simplebank with Jetty
Security Systems
In the Snort folder is both the Snort configuration. The folder rules, contains
the rules which was supplied with Ubuntu 11.10 and the Snort package. The
folder newrules contains the rules which was downloaded from the Sourcefire
website and tested with the latest version of snort as mentioned in Section
7.1.2. In the folder newrules is also the new configuration file which was used
with the newest rule set, this configuration file was also downloaded from
sourcefire.
The folder named ModSecurity contains both the ModSecurity configuration
as well as the rules used by ModSecurity.
i
The Suricata folder contains both the configuration file which is a yaml-style
file. It also contains a subfolder with the emerging threat rules which were
used with Suricata.
The last folder is named ossec and contains the OSSEC configuration and
rules. The folder named etc contains the configuration for OSSEC, and the
folder named rules contains the rules.
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Appendix B
Screenshots of the Simplebank
Application
Pictures of the different screens in the simplebank is included in this appendix.
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Figure B.1: Frontpage for the Simplebank
Figure B.2: Loginpage for the Simplebank
iv
Figure B.3: Register new user page
Figure B.4: Account overview page
v
Figure B.5: Create new account page
Figure B.6: Transfer money page
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